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ANENCEPHALICS AS ORGANS DONORS: AN ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF 
THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON BRAIN DEATH. 
Neely Anne Towe Egan. (Sponsored by Robert J. Levine). Department of 
Internal Medicine, Yale University, School of Medicine, New Haven, CT. 
In 1968, the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee on Brain Death created the 
criteria to determine brain death and consequently revolutionized the 
practices of intensive medicine and organ transplantation. Since their 
drafting, the brain death criteria have been slightly adapted as 
advancements have been made in brain function measurements, but the 
basic requirements of loss of consciousness, responsiveness, 
spontaneous movements and breathing, and reflexes have been strictly 
adhered to despite much criticism. The most recent tide of criticism 
has surfaced in the debate over whether to use anencephalic infants as 
organ donors. The anencephalic is born without the cerebral 
hemispheres which would give the infant consciousness, responsiveness 
and voluntary movements, but is born with a brainstem which gives him 
or her spontaneous breathing and reflexes and thus is excluded from 
acceptance as a suitable organ donor under the brain death criteria. 
However, an analysis of the influences which surrounded the Ad Hoc 
Committee and a careful study of the unpublished papers of the 
Committee's chairman, Dr. Henry Beecher, and of the correspondence he 
conducted with members of the Committee reveals the true intent of 
the Ad Hoc Committee and that this intent is far from today's practice 
of the criteria of brain death. If the original intent of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Brain Death were applied to the anencephalic, then the 
anencephalic could be accepted as a suitable organ donor. 
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ANENCEPHALICS AS ORGAN DONORS: 
AN ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF THE ORIGINAL INTENT 
OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON BRAIN DEATH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"At death's door" is an expression which is used in everyday 
language to describe those who are about to die. It conjures up images 
of someone, frail and gaunt, night-gown clad, who is cautiously 
extending a toe over a threshold which, once crossed, will result in the 
irreversible transition from life into death. Until recently, physicians 
and society have recognized the threshold as the irreversible loss of 
spontaneous heartbeat and respiration. The advent of intensive care and 
resuscitative medicine, however, has confounded this transition. Death's 
threshold has become a shadowy region where functions, previously 
irreversible, can be lost and regained and lost again. In 1968, several 
physicians, lawyers and ethicists gathered to examine this threshold, to 
define death given the influences of modern medicine. This Ad Hoc 
Committee created criteria which, when present, indicated Brain Death. 
These criteria, not surprisingly, measured functions of the brain - 
consciousness, responsiveness, spontaneous movements and breathing, 
and reflexes. The formulation of the brain death criteria established the 
notion that the diagnosis of death required irreversible loss of 
consciousness, perception, and personality rather than the irreversible 
loss of vital bodily functions, such as heart beat and respiration, which 
could be maintained artificially. The image of someone stepping across 
a threshold was replaced with a split image of a body attached to 
\ 
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ventilators and I.V. lines and another fully animated image slipping 
furtively across that threshold. 
Since their drafting, the brain death criteria have been slightly 
adapted as advancements have been made in brain function 
measurements, but the basic requirements of loss of consciousness, 
responsiveness, spontaneous movements and breathing, and reflexes have 
been strictly adhered to despite much criticism. The most recent tide of 
criticism has surfaced in the debate over whether to use anencephalic 
infants as organ donors. The anencephalic is born without the cerebral 
hemispheres which would give the infant consciousness, responsiveness 
and voluntary movements, but is born with a brainstem which gives him 
or her spontaneous breathing and reflexes. The infant's prognosis is 
grim; death from cardiorespiratory arrest usually within days. The 
anencephalic should be an ideal pediatric organ donor, but the manner in 
which anencephalic infants die deprives their hearts, livers and kidneys 
of oxygen and makes those organs unsuitable for transplantation. 
Parents of these infants as well as surgeons and legislators have called 
for the criteria of defining brain death to be altered or overlooked in 
order to use these infants as donors, in order to derive something good 
from an otherwise tragic situation. Thus far, no change has been made; 
the original brain death criteria are defended and followed to the letter. 
It is my hypothesis that the Ad Hoc Committee of 1968, the 
drafters of the brain death criteria, intended a definition of death far 
from what is presently being defended in their name. I believe that the 
Committee failed to precisely outline both the problems they hoped they 
were solving and the intent of their criteria. This imprecision has 
created a definition of death which erroneously excludes the 

anencephalic infant, which keeps the anencephalic infant waiting at 
death's door on the wrong side of the threshold. I intend to demonstrate 
that an analysis of the influences which surrounded the Committee and a 
careful study of the unpublished papers of the Committee's chairman, Dr. 
Henry Beecher, and of the correspondence he conducted with members of 
the Committee reveal the true intent of the Ad Hoc Committee,3 and that 
this intent is far from today's practice of the criteria of brain death. In 
order to understand the brain death criteria's impact on the anencephalic 
debate and on the perception of death, I propose first to analyze the 
anencephalic organ donor issue; secondly, to trace the evolution of 
death's definition and diagnosis throughout history; and then to extract 
the true intent and significance of the Ad Hoc Committee's brain death 
criteria and juxtapose this intent on the anencephalic debate. I believe 
if the original intent of the Committee can be clarified and the 
significance of their definition appreciated, we will then accept 
anencephalics as suitable organ donors and be closer to understanding 
death's shadowy threshold. 
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II. THE ANENCEPHALIC DEBATE 
In the past few years, medical interest in pediatric organ 
transplantation has rapidly expanded. Developments in immunosuppression 
and refinements in surgical techniques - particularly cardiac replacement 
in newborns - has created hope for some parents whose children have 
otherwise fatal heart, kidney, and liver disease, such as hypoplastic left 
heart syndrome, endocardial fibroelastosis, biliary atresia, congenital 
metabolic disorders which lead to liver failure and various causes of end 
stage renal disease. With this hope has come a concomitant increase in 
demand for usable pediatric cadaver organs. The estimated demand for 
hearts is 500 to 600 per year, for kidneys 300 to 450 per year and for 
livers 400 to 800 per year. But thus far, supply has fallen far short of 
demand; nationally, 30 to 50 percent of children under the age of two who 
are registered for transplantation die while waiting for donor hearts and 
livers to become available.(116,185, 205) In older patients, cadaver 
organs for transplantation come primarily from the victims of accidents, 
especially auto and motorcycle collisions. Relatively few newborns and 
very young children die under these circumstances.(42) Furthermore, the 
vast majority of severely handicapped, dying neonates are not suitable for 
organ donation either because of their underlying disease or infection or 
because the life supports and drugs administered in newborn Intensive Care 
Units render their vital organs unsuitable.(60) 
The search for organs has led investigators to target the organs of 
anencephalic infants. Anencephaly is a congenital, partial or complete, 
absence of the cranial vault as well as overlying tissues and varying 

degrees of malformation and destruction of the exposed brain rudiments. 
Its genesis is in the first month of gestation. The primary abnormality is 
failure of cranial neurulation, the embryologic process that separates the 
precursors of the forebrain from amniotic fluid. There is subsequent 
destruction of the exposed tissue, producing a hemorrhagic, fibrotic mass 
of neurons and glia with no functional cerebral cortex and varying degrees 
of brainstem function.(93) The brainstem does allow for intact respiratory 
and circulatory function. Thus infants with anencephaly are permanently 
unconscious, yet they breathe spontaneously and their hearts beat at a 
regular rate and rhythm. These infants also display behaviors of brainstem 
origin, such as responses to noxious stimuli (avoidance, withdrawal or 
crying), feeding reflexes (rooting, sucking, or swallowing), respiratory 
reflexes (breathing, coughing or hiccups), and many interactions involving 
eye movements and facial expressions that are seen in newborns with 
intact cerebral hemispheres.(177) Experience with other cerebral lesions, 
such as persistent vegetative state (PVS) and locked-in syndrome, 
indicates that the suffering associated with noxious stimuli (pain) is a 
cerebral interpretation of the stimuli; therefore, infants with anencephaly 
presumably have no conscious experience of pain and cannot suffer.13 
Although anencephalic infants have a slightly higher than normal 
incidence of anomalies in other organ systems (about 13 - 33%), most of 
their organs appear to be morphologically and functionally suitable for 
transplantation.(93) With an incidence of 0.3 per 1000 births, there are 
approximately 1050 infants born each year with anencephaly, two thirds of 
which are stillborn, leaving 375 which could be potential organ 
sources.(177) 
Prenatal testing of alpha fetoprotein levels and subsequent high 
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resolution ultrasonography have dramatically increased the diagnosis of 
anencephaly in utero, and many anencephalic fetuses are aborted. No data 
are available to estimate the effect of more aggressive screening on the 
potential supply of organs from anencephalics.c But, nevertheless, the 
parents of at least 24 anencephalic newborns have sought to donate their 
infants organs through a program at Loma Linda University Medical Center 
and others have inquired at other medical centers. 
The appearance of the infant with anencephaly is unique and the 
diagnosis can be made with virtual certainty when the following criteria 
are met; 1) a large portion of the skull is absent, 2) the scalp, which 
extends to the margin of the bone, is absent over the skull defect, 3) 
hemorrhagic, fibrotic tissue is exposed because of defects in the skull and 
scalp, and 4) recognizable cerebral hemispheres are absent. Errors in 
diagnosis have been described in the literature by surveillance programs 
and by the Task Force on Anencephaly in a survey of pediatric training 
programs. Scalp covered lesions such as those seen in cases of 
microcephaly, encephaloceles, atelencephaly, holoprosencephaly, and 
hydranencephaly do not meet the above criteria. Defects that do not extend 
to the anterior skull as in iniencephaly do not meet the criteria either.(93) 
Most reported anencephalic infants have died within the first days 
after birth. In three large series by Baird and Sadovnick, Pomerance and 
Schifrin, and Melnick and Myrianthopoulos, survival beyond one week 
occurred in none, 5%, and 9% of such infants respectively. Survival for as 
long as 3 months and 14 months has been reported. However, these data 
are confounded by two problems; one, unusually long survival is often poorly 
documented with regard to the certainty of diagnosis of anencephaly; and 
two, early death may involve the decision to withhold varying degrees of 
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medical treatment which might have otherwise prolonged survival. Because 
of the lack of higher brain function, the anencephalic infant's respiratory 
system intermittently lapses with increasing frequency until respiration 
ceases entirely. In most cases cardiorespiratory arrest apparently occurs 
before the cessation of brainstem functions. This may be due to a variety 
of mechanisms including endocrine dysfunction, hypotension, hypopnea, 
aspiration, hypothermia or infection. Many of these complications, 
presumably, could be effectively treated but how long these infants could 
survive with standard neonatal intensive care is unknown.(20,126,147) 
Experience from Loma Linda with infants who were given maximal support 
showed that many became more vigorous and that most survived at least 
one week without loss of brainstem functions.(142) 
Despite these clinical considerations, anencephalic infants remain 
potential sources of organs for transplantation for several reasons. These 
newborns have universally poor prognoses, no detectable state of 
consciousness or pain, and yet initially have viable healthy hearts, livers 
and kidneys. The only biological problem in using the anencephalic cadaver 
as an organ donor lies in the way these infants die. As mentioned above, the 
infant experiences progressive lapses in respiration leading eventually to 
cardiorespiratory arrest. However, these lapses also result in 
oxygen-starved organs that are so severely damaged they are no longer 
suitable for transplantation.(110) The literature reveals 80 infants with 
anencephaly which have been involved in transplantation protocols at 25 
institutions. The most important of these studies authored by litaka in 
1978, Holzgreve in 1987, and Peabody, the Loma Linda trial, in 1989.^ 
There have been four general approaches used to obtain organs from 
anencephalic infants. In the first approach, the infant is immediately 
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placed on maximal life support systems at birth. The organs are removed as 
soon as technically possible without regard to the presence or absence of 
brainstem findings (in other words, whether or not brain death has 
occurred). Holzgreve used this approach to remove kidneys from three 
infants with anencephaly and successfully transplanted the kidneys within 
one hour of birth into four recipients. All four recipients have functioning 
kidneys three years after transplant.(92) 
The second approach is to place the infant immediately on maximal 
life support systems at birth and observe until all brain stem functions 
cease. Of the eight infants that have been monitored in this fashion, only 
one met brain death criteria within one week but the infant's organs were 
neither removed nor transplanted because of problems locating a suitable 
recipient. The other seven were removed from life support equipment at 
one week and allowed to die. 
The third approach is to give the infant standard minimal care until 
substantial hypotension, hypoxia or bradycardia develops separately or in 
combination. At that point, the child is placed on maximal life support 
systems and observed to determine whether all brainstem functions have 
been lost. Of the nine infants monitored in this fashion, two lost all brain 
stem functions and one’s organs went on to transplantation. The other 
seven were removed from life support equipment at one week and allowed 
to die. 
The fourth approach is to give the infant standard minimal care until 
the development of cardiac arrest. At this point, the infant is resuscitated, 
placed on maximal life support systems and observed to determine whether 
all brain stem functions have been lost. Three infants have been monitored 
in this approach. Two met brain death criteria. 
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The success rates for transplantation with each of these approaches 
described above is; 100% for the first approach - resuscitate and 
transplant; 0% for the second approach - resuscitate, wait for brain death, 
and transplant; 11% for the third approach - wait until failing, resuscitate, 
wait for brain death, and transplant; and 0% for the fourth approach, wait 
until cardiac arrest, resuscitate, wait for brain death, and transplant. 
The conclusion drawn from these figures is that transplantation is 
successful only when brain death criteria are ignored or, at best, current 
standards for resuscitation are ignored. The only course of action open to 
transplant surgeons is to remove the necessary organs from the 
anencephalic sometime during the infant's brief life span, preferably as 
close to birth as possible. However, if the heart is removed from an 
anencephalic infant, the immediate termination of that infant's heartbeat 
results; if the kidneys and liver are removed, eventual cardiorespiratory 
collapse results secondary to liver or renal "failure." These procedures are 
akin to battery and murder and are likewise against the law. (In fact, the 
physician who performs such procedure exposes himself or herself to 
homicide charges.) Likewise those parents who have rejected the option to 
undergo a therapeutic abortion, choosing instead to carry the fetus to term, 
and upon delivery wish to donate their child’s organs to other imperiled 
newborns in order to create some positive meaning from an otherwise 
tragic situation are forbidden to do so by law. Physicians, lawmakers and 
philosophers have begun working individually and collaboratively to come up 
with a solution. 
For those who seek to use anencephalic infants as organ donors, the 
solution involves circumventing the current brain death criteria 
encompassed in the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the 
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Uniform Anatomic Gift Act (UAGA). The UDDA and UAGA were written in 
response to modern medical technology's need for clarification of the 
definition of death and to facilitate the process of organ transplantation. 
The UDDA defines death as 1) the irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory function or 2) the irreversible loss of all functions of the 
entire brain including the brain stem. The UAGA clearly states that 
anatomic gifts can only be made after the donor has been declared dead. 
The current use of anencephalic infants as outlined above in Approach 1 is 
in direct violation of the UAGA because anencephalic infants do not meet 
the criteria of death established by the UDDA since live born anencephalic 
infants invariably have some level of brainstem function, tenuous as it may 
be. 
The protagonists who support the use of anencephalic donors believe 
that either the UDDA should be amended to include anencephalic infants as 
"dead"® or that the UAGA should be amended to allow parents to donate their 
anencephalic infant's organs without the requisite pronouncement of death.f 
There are three lines of reasoning these investigators have used to justify 
their arguments. The first is that anencephalics are brain dead already; the 
second, that anencephalics are special exceptions to the criteria that 
define death; and the third, that the definition of whole brain death is 
antiquated and should be revised. 
The first line of reasoning, which is used exclusively by Holzgreve, 
holds that anencephalic infants are brain absent and therefore brain 
dead.(92) Says Holzgreve, "the anencephalic fetus, because of the absence 
of brain development, has never been alive despite the presence of a 
heartbeat." This concept is accepted in the courts of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and allows the termination of pregnancy at anytime during 

11 
gestation. The basis for this rationalization comes from a paper by 
Chervenak, other American OB-GYNs, and medical ethicists that included 
anencephaly as one of the morally justifiable indications for third 
trimester abortion. They rationalized thus because of the highly reliable 
diagnostic procedures available for prenatal diagnosis and because third 
trimester abortion would allow the mother to conceive again earlier. (45) 
Holzgreve believes that the third trimester fetus is not any different than 
the newborn anencephalic and there should not be any special 
considerations at birth. The principal problem with using this argument in 
the United States, of course, is that of law; birth endows the born with the 
rights of American citizenship, the so-called inalienable rights of life, 
liberty and pursuit of happiness, and thus are protected under the 
Fourteenth amendment from being killed.9 
The notion of according newborns with full status of persons is, 
however, a relatively recent phenomenon that was developed in the late 
Nineteenth Century. Historically, many societies have expressed their 
prejudices against children in the widespread practice of infanticide - in 
some societies sanctioned by the state, in others formally prohibited but 
tacitly accepted. The ancient Greeks feared that defective persons would 
transmit undesirable traits onto the next generation and therefore actively 
promoted killing such children at birth. Grecian law allowed infants to be 
exposed to the elements until the time they would be admitted to the 
family through a special ceremony, the amphidromia. By the Middle Ages, 
infanticide had acquired the stamp of official condemnation in England, yet 
few cases of infanticide were tried in the king's courts.*1 Instead, these 
instances were dealt with by ecclesiastical authorities who regarded 
infanticide as a venial sin that could be handled under the traditional 
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requirements of penance: one year on bread and water and two more years 
without wine or meat for intentionally smothering an infant.(202, at pp. 
12-13) 
The second line of reasoning which would allow using anencephalic 
infants as organ donors involves defining anencephalic infants as 
exceptions to the criteria for the diagnosis of death. Some investigators 
believe that anencephalic infants are appropriate exceptions because an 
important feature of anencephaly is the relative certainty of diagnosis and 
universally grim prognosis. This certainty should allow anencephalic 
infants to be labeled as "brain absent" persons. The quality of brain absence 
would exclude them from the diagnosis of brain death (which is difficult 
enough in the newborn population') and the UDDA could be rewritten to 
diagnose death as 1) the irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory function, 2) the irreversible loss of all functions of the entire 
brain including the brain stem, or 3) brain absence. (The wording "including 
the brain stem" was important in order to exclude patients with PVS and 
other similar syndromes from being defined as dead.) The UAGA could be 
rewritten to allow donation from dead or brain absent donors. Harrison 
argues that the whole brain definitions were drafted to serve the comatose 
patient whose injured brain might not recover function.(87, at p. 1385) 
However, failure of the brain to develop is clearly different from injury. 
The terms of brain death cannot apply to anencephalic infants because they 
lack the physical structure which is necessary for recovery. 
The rationalization of using anencephalic infants because they are 
brain absent persons has come under tremendous attack, the most strident 
being from those who are not convinced of the precision of the diagnosis 
and prognosis. Although most studies show that the diagnosis and 
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prognosis of anencephalic infants are precise and grim, the previously 
mentioned survey that was undertaken by the Task Force on Anencephaly 
disproves that anencephaly can be universally diagnosed precisely and 
points to the conclusion that the criteria for diagnosis listed above are 
insufficiently specific and/or leave too much room for physician error. 
Ethicists insist that we cannot allow misdiagnosis to inadvertently provide 
inappropriate donors. Medearis says that "the evidence indicates that 
anencephaly is a heterogeneous condition anatomically and functionally, 
that the diagnosis of anencephaly cannot be made with sufficient accuracy 
and that the condition cannot be distinguished well enough from other 
severe intracranial disorders to justify changing the law."(124, at p. 393) 
Other critics argue that misdiagnosis by itself would not appear to 
be a great enough risk to preclude the use of anencephalic infants but their 
observed relationship to infants with other congenital neurological defects 
is a major concern. Hydranencephalic and some microcephalic infants are 
conceptually indistinguishable from anencephalic babies in that they all 
suffer from lethal neurologic conditions that preclude normal brain 
development. Because of the existence of these other diagnostic 
categories, critics like Alan Shewmon feel that decision-makers will be 
pressured to expand the "definition" to sweep in other similarly situated 
"dead neonates."(176, at p. 1778) In somewhat different terms, Shewmon's 
real fear here is the Pandora's box supposedly inherent in defining death. 
Once the camel's nose is under the tent, there is no way to keep it from 
getting the rest of its body inside. This is the so-called "slippery slope" 
argument; once the first step is allowed, there is no way to prevent sliding 
down to the horrors at the bottom (i.e., harvesting the organs of anyone 'we' 
consider undesirable, unnecessary, unworthy). The only effective way to 
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stop what this argument contends is inevitable is to ensure that not even 
the first step be permitted.! 
Another objection to the "brain absent" theory is that brain absent 
individuals are still persons, and as such, are entitled to be full members of 
the moral community with rights and worthy of respect. The question then 
becomes whether prolonging the infant's life by mechanical ventilation and 
then abruptly terminating it by harvesting vital organs is compatible with 
the minimum respect due all persons.(14, at p. 2284) Kantian philosophy, 
which is the source of many contemporary moral theories and is based on 
the concept of personhood, is embodied in the Mere Means Principle which 
states: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end."(99, at p. 96) This principle forbids the 
use of a person merely as a means to benefit another and much of our legal 
and moral tradition upholds this principle. Thus, it is understandable that 
there is considerable reluctance to intrude on an individual anencephalic 
infant’s bodily integrity in order to further the interests of another albeit 
dying child. Critics maintain that to assign the label of "brain absent 
persons" to anencephalics implies that they must be accorded the rights of 
persons and to consider the propriety of removing organs from an 
independently breathing infant in order to benefit others raises the 
Orwellian possibility that not all offspring of human parents qualify as 
"persons" accorded individual rights. 
A compelling objection to the brain absent theory is that 
anencephalic infants, despite their poor prognosis, are dying and not, in 
fact, dead. Dying persons are entitled to full measure of respect and 
dignity. Capron emphasizes that any policy that would allow the killing of a 
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living patient for their organs (especially the most vulnerable) is too 
odious for consideration. Because they do not meet the current definition 
of death, they are then, by definition, living persons.(42, at p. 6) 
"Adding anencephalics to the category of dead 
persons would be a radical change, both in the social 
and medical understanding of what it means to be 
dead and in the social practices surrounding death. 
Anencephalic infants may be dying, but they are still 
alive and breathing. Calling them "dead" will not 
change physiologic reality or otherwise cause them 
to resemble those (cold and nonrespirating) bodies 
that are considered appropriate for post-mortem 
examinations and burial."(42, at p. 6) 
Gilbert Meilander's critique implicitly builds upon Capron’s concerns 
by pointing out that if a dying person is accorded rights then the use of 
anencephalics as donors violates those rights: 
"To intervene in this baby's living and dying in ways 
we normally reject (because we think it an 
indignity to a dying subject) would be to do so for 
reasons entirely unrelated to the case of Baby Z. 
What we accomplish thereby would be good; what 
we do would not."(125, at p. 23) 
Another way the investigators have justified making anencephalic 
infants legitimate donors which gets around the brain death criteria and the 
Kantian objection is to regard them as "nonpersons" i.e. biologically human 
entities that nevertheless lack the prerequisites of "personal" life and thus 
lack full moral status. Dr. Leonard Bailey, a transplant surgeon at Loma 
Linda termed the anencephalic infant a "nonperson human derivative."(75) 
Those writing on the subject of personhood have attempted to answer the 

question "what properties must a being possess in order for it to have a 
right to life?" Typically, the response is given in the form of a list of 
characteristics which represent a rough sketch of the necessary, and 
perhaps sufficient, conditions for being a person. Rationality and 
self-consciousness are the common denominators among the various 
inventories.^ Philosophers and ethicists have relied on this premise to 
draw a distinction between persons and human beings. Persons can be 
viewed as a subset of humanity and only those humans who possess or have 
the potential to possess certain attributes attain the status of persons and 
as such have rights and autonomy which must be respected. Thus, only 
beings of, or having the potential for, sapient life have the rights and 
privileges of personhood. If anencephalic newborns are nonpersons, one 
could perhaps justify using them as mere means for the benefit of actual 
"persons." 
The idea that a product of human conception is biologically incapable 
of achieving "humanness" seems radical until we consider the many 
products of conception lost by early miscarriage and stillbirth because of 
gross abnormalities, or those fetuses who are therapeutically aborted when 
they are "nonviable." As stated above, anencephaly is the one condition upon 
which there is agreement that even very late third trimester abortions are 
morally permissible.(45) Proponents of the "nonperson" rationalization do 
not believe that the considerations which uniquely permit late abortion for 
anencephaly should suddenly cease to apply at the time of live birth. They 
argue that the contrast between the refusal to perform very late abortions 
on other fetuses and the practice regarding anencephalics indicates that 
physicians and a society regard them as nonpersons. They also believe that 
the reluctance to interfere with these infants immediately following birth 
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is explainable only as a wish to conform with legal prohibitions. They 
propose to reverse the causal relationship, so that the law in this area 
reflects social consensus and medical reality. 
Chervenak's paper aside, critics argue that the proposals to harvest 
vital organs from anencephalics are premised on an analysis identical to 
that used to justify abortion. The moral stricture against harvesting 
organs applies only to persons. These infants can no more satisfy even 
minimal criteria of personhood than can fetuses. Moreover, even though 
many would agree that the potential for development inherent in fetuses 
and infants merits protection, that argument disappears in the case of 
anencephalics, for such entities will never qualify as persons in the sense 
put forth by proponents of personhood theory. These critics believe that the 
conceptual relationship between the anencephalic newborn and a nonviable 
fetus "ex utero" is a close one.(72, at p. 946) Both are capable of 
independently sustaining respiration, albeit for a limited time and 
consequently, both qualify under the current statutory framework as living 
persons. However, in England, the Peel Commission, appointed to study the 
ethical and legal implications of fetal research in 1972, reached a 
conclusion that treated nonviable fetuses in substantially the same manner 
as dead fetuses.1 The Commission's recommendations permit 
experimentation that would terminate vital functions of the nonviable 
fetus. In the United States, however, federal regulations toward research 
involving the fetus "ex utero" conform to the predominating live birth 
standard and prohibit any experimentation on a nonviable fetus that would 
terminate the heartbeat or respiration.(112, at p. 407) It is the view of one 
author, however, that it was a growing appreciation of the highly developed 
neurological structure possessed by nonviable fetuses and the 
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accompanying capacity to experience pain that was the basis of the 
difference between the English and American regulations.(72, at p. 948) 
The anencephalic is distinct from nonviable fetuses in its lack of such 
neurological structures and consequently would qualify differently under 
U.S. regulations if the ability to experience pain were the issue. Therefore, 
there is precedent for declining to recognize the significance of borderline 
biological life in both the Peel Report and the U.S. regulations when applied 
to anencephalics. 
The Roman Catholic Church, although hardly a supporter of the 
abortion issue, considers anencephalics "nonpersons" because they lack a 
"human soul." According to Roman Catholic tradition, the human soul has 
the power or the potential power of reason and of thinking in terms of 
concepts and of the inner nature of things. Since the anencephalic lacks the 
requisite brain structures for these processes, he or she is therefore, in the 
eyes of the Catholic church, without a soul and accordingly is a suitable 
organ donor. 
Objections to the nonperson rationalization are again myriad. If the 
theory is carried to its logical conclusion, other infants with conditions 
such as holoprosencephaly, hydranencephaly and certain trisomies, as well 
as adults in persistent vegetative states, should be considered as potential 
organ donors - again the slippery slope argument. Capron objects that this 
"nonperson" concept would be a radical redefinition of the accepted 
criterion for being a person, "namely live birth of the product of human 
conception."(43, at p. 8) 
History, however, provides us with many examples whereby some 
products of human conception were not deemed "persons". Beginning in the 
Middle Ages, the common law recognized a class of nonhuman beings, 

"monsters" who were humanly conceived but were not considered human 
beings. Human beings were considered "reasonable creatures in being," a 
term denoting the capacity (presently or prospectively) to reason. This 
principle was carried forward in the first nationwide German penal code, 
the so-called Carolina , which was in force in a substantial part of Europe 
from its enactment in 1532 until 1871. In contrast to Roman Law, which 
punished the killing of slaves only as the destruction of property, the 
Carolina Code drew no distinctions between human beings as far as 
homicide was concerned, with the notable exception of abortion and 
"monster" killing. Such creatures were presumed to lack souls, and were 
therefore not considered persons to whom the statutes governing the 
protection of human life applied. Two rationales have been put forth in 
explanation of the historic denial of personhood to newborns, particularly 
defective ones. The first substantially undercuts the authority of these 
long-standing doctrines. It is the belief in "hybridity," the notion that 
these anomalous infants must have been the product of an animal paternity. 
By definition, then, they could be denied status as human beings since they 
lacked full human parentage. The second is exemplified by English 
physician Charles Mercier's writings of 1911: 
"In comparison with other cases of murder, a 
minimum of harm is done by it... The victim's mind 
is not sufficiently developed to enable it to suffer 
from the contemplation of approaching suffering or 
death. It is incapable of feeling fear or terror. Nor is 
its consciousness sufficiently developed to enable it 
to suffer pain in appreciable degree. Its loss leaves 
no gap in any family circle, deprives no children of 
their breadwinner or their mother, no human being of 
a friend, helper, or companion. The crime diffuses no 
sense of insecurity. No one feels a whit less safe 

because the crime has been committed."(72 at p. 950) 
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But, after all, what difference does it make if the anencephalic 
infant's life is shortened by a few hours? There is an intuitive appeal to 
this question that is based on utilitarian calculations (and perhaps 
euthanasia interests). First, lacking the necessary structure, these infants 
are oblivious to what little life they have and so active termination could 
do them no conceivable harm. Second, it benefits the parents by shortening 
their grieving process and allowing them to salvage some good from a bad 
situation. And third, it saves the life of a recipient. Surely, using the 
anencephalic as organ donor maximizes health within society, but does 
maximal happiness accompany this procurement of health? Is the cost of 
that happiness too great? 
Thus, we come to the third line of reasoning that proponents for 
allowing anencephalic infants to be used as organ donors have argued which 
is that our current definition of death is antiquated and needs to be revised. 
These proponents believe that death of the person should be equated with 
irreversible loss of cortical function since the continued identity of the 
person depends on the presence of cortical function. Based on criteria that 
require some level of cognitive function, an argument can be made that 
brainstem activity alone has no intrinsic moral significance. Indeed, some 
proponents of a higher brain definition of death believe that a concept of 
death which focuses on respiration and circulation or on integrating 
capacity is biologically reductionistic.(192, at p. 312) The higher brain 
concept represents a philosophical view of death fundamentally different 
from that embodied in either the whole brain or cardiopulmonary 
formulations. The former equates personhood with consciousness and the 
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cognitive functions, arguing that since these abilities set humanity apart 
from other species, their loss can be equated with death.m Other 
proponents suggest that the whole brain death formulations are, in fact, 
morally wrong. As Veith writes, 
"If there were no offense, no moral or social costs in 
treating dead persons as if they were alive, then the 
safer course would be to continue to do so. Quite 
clearly, however, this is not the case. In addition to 
reflecting an inadequate understanding of the nature 
of man, it is an affront to the individual person or 
that person's memory to treat a human being who has 
irreversibly lost all [higher] brain function as if he 
were alive. It confuses the person with his corpse 
and is morally wrong."(194, at p. 420) 
The critics of course have a response and this one is cited in the 
influential report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. They 
afforded the brainstem with moral significance because 1) it serves as the 
principal source of integration for vital physiologic processes and 2) 
perhaps more important from a public policy standpoint, it produces 
sufficient activity in individuals to support the appearance of being alive 
by our basic intuitive criteria. These patients breathe spontaneously, may 
have sleep-wake cycles with eye opening and movement and they may yawn 
and have reflex motor activity. For the family member at the bedside, such 
a patient is not dead. The commission believed that attempts to define 
such patients as dead would be met with confusion and suspicion that the 
medical community was turning to the horror movie "Coma" for its 
directives.11 
In summary, pioneering triumphs in transplantation have created a 

profound dilemma. Should physicians manipulate the definitions of life and 
death to meet this growing demand for donor tissue? Should laws defining 
death be rewritten to allow the "harvesting" of anencephalic donors? 
Should the definition death be swayed by transplantation needs? Before we 
begin to grapple with these questions, a review of how death has been 
interpreted, regarded and diagnosed throughout history is required. 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF DEATH’S DEFINITION AND DIAGNOSIS 
The preceding review of the anencephalic debate reveals that despite 
much scholarly discussion and deliberation there still exists considerable 
public confusion about the definition of death. It appears that there is no 
consensus on whether or not the anencephalic infant is by definition dead or 
alive. Surely this confusion stems from the fear that death is not really as 
certain as taxes, that its threshold is more shadowy than we would care to 
believe. This is certainly not a new phenomenon. Since the beginning of 
time, the mystery of death has constituted a fearful problem and in order to 
cope with it man has developed and continues to develop ideology and ritual 
to handle its emotional challenge. In order to assess the significance of the 
concept of brain death, a review of how death has been interpreted, 
regarded, and diagnosed throughout history, will be undertaken. 
To prehistoric people, as to people from primitive cultures, death 
appeared to be a form of deep sleep.(63, at p. 1) They considered death to be 
a world much like somnolence that "differed from this one only its 
diminished intensity".(12, at p. 23) Ancient as well as modern literature 
abound with references that equate death with slumber. The Homeric Hades 
speak of the dead as a "dim multitude," "unfeeling phantoms of exhausted 
humans," that "are sleeping the sleep of death." Virgil's underworld is a 
"kingdom of shadows," the "abode of sleep" and a "sleep inducing night." 
Oliver and Roland say good-bye as if each were about to fall into a long 
sleep of indefinite duration.(12, at p. 23) Indeed, the belief that the dead are 
asleep is as constant as it is ancient. The Greeks compared Death, which 
took the shape of a beautiful young man resembling Eros, and compared him 
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to his brother Sleep. They called their burial grounds "cemeteries" which 
means "sleeping rooms."(107, at p. 153) The medieval and Gallican liturgies 
mention the nomina pausantium (the names of those who sleep) and invite 
the faithful to pray "pro spiritibus pausantium" (for the souls of those who 
sleep). The Extreme Unction reserved for the clergy in the Middle Ages was 
called the dormientum exitum (the sacrament of those who sleep), and today 
in many churches the prayers for the dead are said for the repose of their 
souls. (12, at p. 24) 
The diagnosis of sleep-death was made when attempts to wake the 
dead failed. Shouting, loud noises, and attempts to inflict pain by slapping 
or whipping the "sleeping" with wet clothes or stinging nettles constituted 
the first tests for death and established the notion that death, unlike sleep, 
was a permanent and irreversible condition.(63,184) 
Gradually as man became more aware of his finiteness and this 
awareness became more frightening, man began to seek abstract, elaborate 
and often powerful explanations which would allow him to cope with his 
biological eventuality. One of the most pervasive themes often set within 
religious or philosophical systems of belief is the concept of immortality. 
Early man began to regard death as a transition from one life to another 
form of life. Indeed, the Dead Sea Scrolls of the First Century B.C. focus no 
attention on the biological aspect of death, but rather focus upon the 
possibility of transition from one, this-worldly, mode of existence to 
another - from what is metaphorically described as "death " to "life."(18, at 
p. 245) 
As the emphasis on the concept of death as a transition process grew 
so did the emphasis on burial as a rite of passage, with the mortuary rituals 
and funeral customs reflecting the culture from which they were derived but 
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all sharing the theme that death merely separated an active life from an 
active afterlife. The paleolithic people prepared and inhumed their dead 
with food and other equipment, implying the belief that the dead would have 
needs to meet in their next life. In ancient Egypt, the body was put through 
an elaborate burial ceremony which included mummification to preserve the 
corpse from disintegration. Tombs were built within great pyramids and 
were filled with the best furniture, jewelry, tools and pictures of the 
deceased and his family. In Peru and China, tombs have been found with 
substances alleged to have life-prolonging properties such as jade placed in 
the orifices of the corpse.(32, at pp. 11-12) The Greeks and Romans believed 
that the dead must cross a barrier dividing the world of the living from that 
of the dead, the river Styx. Charon, the boatman, carried the corpse in whose 
mouth a coin was placed to pay for the trip. These early customs would 
suggest that man refused to accept death as the definitive end of life and 
insisted that something of the individual continued to survive the dying 
experience. There also may have been some subtle reassurance in the belief 
that luxuries, medicines, regulations and fees applied in death as well as in 
everyday life.(102, at p. 46; 32, at p. 11) 
Insofar as the dead were recognized as possessing certain qualities 
of the living, provisions were made for communication with the dead in 
some cultures. The earliest Romans buried their deceased next to the hearth 
in their houses, and when the laws prohibited this custom, they interred the 
body just outside the city walls. They believed that the dead continued to 
live in intimacy with their family and from this concept sprang up a "cult of 
the dead." It was also the custom to gather periodically near the dead body 
to tighten the bonds that tied him to the living. Tombs were constructed 
with seats in a semicircle to accommodate the visitors.(32, at p. 13) 
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Western philosophical thought had its beginnings in the midst of 
these beliefs. However, the notion of an actual physical immortality, an 
embodied continuation of life after death, gave way to the conception of an 
immortality in less physical terms, a spiritual immortality with an at least 
partially disembodied "spirit" or "soul." The preSocratics' observations of 
the natural order, and of human life and death as part of it, focused on the 
harmony between man and nature, continuity and change. Parmenides 
stressed the fundamentally unchanging order of things, while Heraclitus 
emphasized the constant change in everything except the Logos. Empedocles 
originated the doctrine of the four elements - earth, air, fire, and water. 
Pythagoras alone presented a comprehensive doctrine with regard to death 
which held that after death souls migrated from one animate being to 
another.(83, at p. 236) 
In the classic writings of Socrates (468-399 B.C.), Plato (4727-437? 
B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the philosophical fountainheads for 
Western ethical thought, we see the scant beginnings of significant thinking 
about death. Plato believed that the "Demiurge" created souls of all the 
planets and all individual souls. These individual souls, he taught, are 
eternal, having existed before they came into bodies. In this preexistence 
"each soul saw all pure ideas in a realm of perfect ideas. But coming into 
the body is like entering a prison. The body clouds the soul and it forgets all 
it has seen."(73, at p. 157) Thus, the goal of the soul, Plato held, is to free 
itself from the body in order that it may see truth clearly. The drama of 
Socrates' trial and execution is central to Plato's discussion of death. In the 
Phaedo. Socrates proclaims as he faces immediate death, 
I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher has 
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reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and 
that after death he may hope to obtain the greatest good 
in the other world...Is death not the separation of soul and 
body? And to be dead is the completion of this: when the 
soul exists in herself, and is released from the body and 
the body is released from the soul, what is this but 
death?"(146, at p. 447) 
Aristotle taught that the soul is to be found wherever there is life 
and, since everywhere in nature there are signs of life, the soul must be 
throughout nature. If we examine nature we will find, according to 
Aristotle, a series of souls beginning with the lowest or plant souls and 
moving upward to the highest or human souls. The human soul is higher 
because it has the power of thinking in terms of concepts, is able to think 
about the inner nature of things, that is, the human soul has the power of 
reason.0 Aristotle divided reason into what he called passive reason and 
creative reason. This creative reason is a spark of the divinity, a part of 
God, which comes in to the soul from without and is not influenced by the 
baser side of the soul (passive reason). This part of the soul survives death 
and since it is actually part of God, simply returns to God. Thus personal 
immortality is impossible in Aristotelian terms.(73, at pp. 158-9) 
The concept of a personal extinction through death was unknown in 
the Western world until the Third Century B.C., during the Hellenistic age, 
when it appeared in the writings of the Greek philosopher Epicurus 
(3427-270 B.C.). The disastrous conclusion of the Peloponnesian War 
precipitated the decline and death of the Greek city states. The Romans, 
powerful, expansive and efficient, achieved great successes on the military 
front but these conquests produced diminishing satisfaction as well as a 
widening gap between those with great wealth and power and those with 
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poverty. Social and political problems abounded and the ancient gods 
offered no comfort. Gilbert Murray refers to this age as marked by a "failure 
of nerve."(83, at p. 238) Into this melange of Greek culture and Roman laws 
and organization, the philosophical schools of Epicureanism and Stoicism 
emerged. These philosophies were not an extension of Socratic inquiry but 
rather prescriptions for a way of life and, not surprisingly, for a way to 
face death. In contrast to the Socratic teachings from which they claimed 
to have been derived, the Hellenistic schools emphasize the negative - 
"deliverance from evil, escape from an alien world, salvation from sin."(83, 
at p. 239) 
Epicurus' remedies were designed to liberate men from fear of the 
gods, to assure them that death was a relief to be welcomed, and that a 
relatively good life could be attained in simplicity and seclusion. The soul, 
being material, dissipated after death and was not part of an immortal 
continuum. Death is the end for both body and soul. As Lucretius, one of the 
later Epicureans, wrote, "A fool will not make more out of the hereafter 
than he has made of this life."(73, at p.159) 
Stoicism, though often contrasted with Epicureanism, shared its 
essential purpose: to provide a way of life designed to make existence 
bearable. For the Stoics this way of life espoused an ethic of rigorous duty 
and civic virtue. Death, however, was seen as an escape from an otherwise 
unavoidable evil. "The door was always open - and [the Stoics] held to the 
conviction (Seneca put it into practice) that suicide was a way out."(83, at 
pp. 238-9) The Stoics held that man is both soul and body, and the soul is a 
spark from the divine fire controlled by a ruling part located in the heart. 
The soul of man was considered the source of perception, judgment, feeling 
and willing, and allowed man to deliberate and make choices before he acted. 
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Various Stoics held different ideas of immortality. Some taught that only 
the good and wise souls continued to exist after death of the body, while all 
other souls perished with the body. Other Stoics held that all souls, 
regardless of their nature, lived until the end of the world. 
Along with Epicureanism and Stoicism, other cures were sought for 
the so-called failure of nerve. Men turned to new and exotic faiths to 
supplement or replace their traditional religion such as Persian Mithraism, 
Menicheanism and the promise of salvation through faith in Jesus of 
Nazareth. The Old Testament as well as the New now entered the 
mainstream of Western culture, and the Hebrew-Christian ethic came to 
dominate Western thinking, including thought about death. 
There is relatively little concern with death in the Hebrew 
scriptures. The prevailing mood of Hebraism was expressed in the passage 
in Ecclesiastes 3:2 "there is a time to be born and a time to die." In the Old 
Testament, attention is focused almost entirely upon this world and its 
activities. Between birth and death there should be a full life and what 
happened after death was not a matter of religious importance. Mortality is 
calmly accepted as part of the definition of being human. Real immortality 
pertains to the race, rather than to individuals, and to vicarious immortality 
through one's descendants.(18, at p. 244) 
Christianity, although rooted in the Old Testament, reversed Hebrew 
emphases. Jesus of Nazareth and the Christian promise of Divine love 
supplied a doctrine of salvation from evil. The natural world (as interpreted 
by Christian theologians, Augustine (354-430 A.D.) and Aquinas (1225 - 
1274 A.D.)) was viewed primarily as the scene of human salvation and 
human kind as essentially sinful, doomed to die and to suffer eternal 
damnation unless rescued by supernatural grace. The earliest spokesman of 
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the Christian church, Paul (50 A.D.?), concentrates upon biological death as a 
consequence of sin (Romans 6:23), unleashed by the disobedience of Adam 
and Eve (Romans 5:19). Death then is the enemy, but since Jesus, perceived 
as having risen from the dead, has conquered this enemy through 
resurrection, death becomes a historical problem not a metaphysical 
one.(18, at p. 245) The power of death has been negated, although it 
temporarily continues to manifest itself biologically. That will cease, at 
the beginning of the "new age," when all followers of Jesus, living or 
deceased, will be granted "immortality."(1 Corinthians 15:53-54) 
These basic beliefs, espoused by the Hebrew-Christian tradition, 
which held that death is a biological process but that the "spirit" or "soul" 
maintained a spiritual immortality remained the primary popular orientation 
toward death through the Middle Ages. However, in the Middle Ages, there 
began a preoccupation with the horror and degradation of death. In the 
Crusades and the Bubonic Plague, medieval man encountered exceptionally 
horrible, violent and disfiguring death.(102, at p. 18) Tombstone markers 
during this time reflected this theme; below the effigies of the deceased 
were placed other effigies of their naked, decaying corpses. These were 
considered the memento mori tombs of the period.(32, at p. 13) The 
doctrinal belief of purgatory (a state of temporary punishment and suffering 
in which the souls of those who have died in grace must expiate their sins) 
also gained unprecedented importance during the Middle Ages. Christian 
funerary rituals reflected this theme; "the entire ceremony was marked by 
black clothes, unbleached wax candles, solemn tolling of the bells. The 
coffin was carried to the church, trailed by a sad cortege and accompanied 
by sounds of mourning and the smells of incense."(32, at p. 12) Other 
customs provided for continued expiation to God in hopes of alleviating the 

31 
sufferings of the departed souls. Wealthy Christians endowed monasteries 
and built chapels where masses could be said regularly for the repose of the 
soul of the dead and those of his relatives.P(32, at p. 13) The terror of death 
is perhaps best seen in the paintings of this time, which picture death as a 
devil, killer, or revengeful destroyer, using a sword, scythe, spade, arrow, 
rope or net during its relentless attempts to trap man.(107, at p. 154) 
Another product of the horror and degradation theme of death in the 
late Middle Ages was the Ars Moriendi. The Ars Moriendi were Christian 
guidebooks for the dying and first appeared early in the Fifteenth Century. 
Their message was that there was an art to dying as well as to living and 
that the two, in fact, were intimately related. One should live each day as 
though it might be the last. This should not lead to self-indulgent or 
immoderate behavior but rather that the sure prospect of death should 
inspire the highest plateau of moral rectitude.(102, at p. 17) 
"For as much as the passage of death, of the 
wretchedness of the exile of this world, for uncunning 
[ignorance] of dying - not only to lewd man [laymen] 
but also to religious and devout persons - seemeth 
wonderfully hard and perilous, and also right fearful 
and horrible; therefore in this present matter and 
treatise, that is of the Craft of Dying, is drawn and 
contained a short manner of exhortation, for teaching 
and comforting them that be in the point of death." 
(102, at p. 18) 
These guides to Christian dying, in addition to providing a model of 
proper behavior to which dying people could aspire, served as practical 
handbooks for those who would come into the presence of the dying person. 
They also provided an assurance that one might pass safely through the 
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dread crisis and functioned as an aid to making the transition from the 
things of this life to the hereafter.(102, at p. 18) It is interesting to note 
that both the fifth section of the longer form of the Ars Moriendi and 
Gerson's De Arte Moriendi advise those who attend the dying man not to give 
him false hopes of regaining the health of his body. This is a commentary not 
only on the state of medicine in the later Middle Ages and on contemporary 
attitudes toward it but also on the Christian understanding of the death of 
the body. Since death was a beginning not an ending, there was no reason to 
take any measures to postpone it.c*(47, at p. 254) 
The Ars Moriendi tradition eventually receded as the high spirited 
Renaissance, the vigorous Industrial Revolution, and the rise of science 
transformed the conditions of everyday life. In 1543 Vesalius published his 
book, The Structure of the Human Body, which dismissed much of Galen's 
descriptions from the second century A.D. and thereby renewed and 
modernized the study of anatomy. William Harvey published in 1628 a 
treatise On the Movement of the Heart and Blood where he set forth the 
doctrine, confirmed by evidence, of the continual circulation of the blood 
through arteries and veins. By the middle of the seventeenth century, 
coordinate geometry had been mapped out by Descartes, the theory of 
probabilities developed by Pascal, and calculus invented by Newton. 
The explosion in physiologic, chemical, and mathematical discovery 
influenced not only the "scientists" but also their philosopher peers. From 
the Renaissance onward, Western thought became predominantly secular and 
scientific. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and 
Rene Descartes (1596 -1650) reflected the influence of science and 
secularism in their thinking. Bacon taught that the human soul was actually 
two souls, one divine or rational and the other irrational. The divine soul 

33 
was, he held, a matter for religion to handle. The irrational soul, however, 
was open to study and understanding by man using the methods of science. 
By these methods Bacon believed that we would find this soul to be material 
but invisible, residing in the head and running along the nerves to all parts 
of the body. The soul was the seat of reason, imagination, understanding, 
memory, appetite and will.(73, at p. 163) 
Hobbes broke completely with the past. He held that the entire 
universe was material and that in such a universe there could be nothing 
corresponding to the human soul as described by earlier philosophers. His 
materialistic position left no room for an immaterial soul that could 
survive the disintegration of the body. 
Descartes felt that the logical result of science was a mechanical 
and materialistic universe, but he was equally certain that this was not the 
complete explanation of the universe. He wrote "the sciences have a 
definitely practical aim, the harnessing of nature to the purposes of man. 
The will o' the wisp o’ his life was the conquest of death not only for the 
soul but also for the body."(46, at p. 111) Both Bacon’s and Descartes' 
writings were concerned with removing the fear of death. Bacon believed 
that if one learned how to live properly and calmly, one would know how die 
in the same manner. Descartes, however, believed in a sharp dichotomy 
between body (res extensa) and mind (res cogitans), the so called Cartesian 
dualism, which allowed Descartes to ascribe to the more traditional view of 
death, which provided the assurance of the survival of the soul.(83, at p. 
240) Descartes held that although the soul is united to all the portions of 
the body 'there is yet... a certain part in which it exercises its functions 
more particularly than in all the others."(55, at p. 345) Of interest to our 
future discussion, Descartes was convinced that this "part" was in the brain, 
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"not the whole of the brain, but merely the most inward of its parts, to wit, 
a certain very small gland which is situated in the middle of its substance," 
that is, the pineal body.(192, at p.3Q9) 
The position of John Locke (1632-1704) resembles very much that of 
Descartes insofar as the universe being composed of two substances, bodies 
and souls, and that souls are spiritual substances endowed with the power 
of perceiving, thinking and willing. Locke, however, shared a different view 
of immortality. For Locke, that the soul is immortal, lives after death of 
the body, is a matter of faith and not a concept which requires scientific 
proof or objective verification. Locke held that that true or certain 
knowledge is derived from experience and since we could have no first hand 
experience of the soul, it must, by definition, be outside of our certain 
knowledge. 
In the Eighteenth Century, David Hume (1711-1776) attacked the 
entire doctrine of immortality, and the French philosophers of the 
Enlightenment (D'Holbach 1723-1789; Cordorcet 1743-1794; Diderot 
1713-1784) held it to be a "priestly lie." Hume, carrying the Lockian 
position to its logical conclusion, held that we can have no certain 
knowledge either of material or spiritual substance. He was agnostic, 
without definite conviction, regarding the soul and believed that "no 
investigation would reveal an immaterial, indivisible, imperishable 
soul-substance."(73, at p. 166) The French philosophers were more adamant 
and held that "Fear of death is the only true enemy that has to be conquered, 
and that there is no afterlife makes us free from the power of the 
priests."(46, at p. 135) 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) held that the understanding cannot know 
anything but that which is experienced. However, reason can go beyond this 
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and conceive of a world of which we can have no actual experience. It can 
transcend, rise above experience and thus give us transcendent principles. 
Reason gives man an idea of soul as the summation of all mental processes. 
Although we can never experience the soul, according to Kant, the idea of 
soul has value and therefore it is legitimate for us to think of it. Although 
we cannot prove the existence of an immortal soul, we may act as though 
one existed since there is real value in so doing. Furthermore, the idea of 
the soul has ethical value, it is a result of the moral law and serves as a 
basis for moral life.(73, at pp. 167-8) 
For Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), Kant's moral argument had other 
implications. Immortality he considered to be a quality of the living spirit, 
not an event in the future. And death, Hegel believed, had "the peculiar effect 
of uniting the individual with universal matter. The living individual is a 
particular person; once dead, however, he becomes, through bodily 
corruption, indistinguishable from abstract being."(90, at p. 192) 
Soren Kierkegard (1813-1855) and the existentialists attacked Hegel 
and traditional philosophy in general for concentrating on the "essence" of 
things as against the "existence" of the specific individual. They 
emphasized the value of the immediate experience as opposed to 
metaphysical abstractions. Like the Romanticist philosophers in their 
emphasis on the values of the individual, the existentialists stressed the 
significance of the crucial experiences of human lives, including the 
experience of death.(83, at p. 241) 
The individualism of Romanticists and of Kierkegaardian 
existentialists contrasts with an outlook that developed during the 
Nineteenth Century and found its expression in Auguste Comte's 
(1798-1857) positivism. For Comte "society is composed of both the dead 
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and the living... For the dead have gone through the moment of change, and 
their monuments are the visible signs of permanence of their city."(13, at p. 
73) The search for a soul and a belief in immortality, meanwhile, Comte 
considered characteristics of an earlier and more childish stage of human 
development. As man becomes more mature in his development, he 
recognizes that such beliefs are not exact, that they are mere wishes which 
cannot be proven or founded upon fact, and therefore must be abandoned.(73, 
at p. 171) 
In summary, death throughout history has been an event approached 
by man with fear and anxiety. No doubt this fear stemmed from the earliest 
perception that death was absolute and irreversible. Some eras have been 
fraught with more fear than others with consequent differences in custom 
and ritual. Along with these customs and rituals man also developed 
different beliefs to cope with his fear of death and different sciences to 
attempt to understand the reality and nature of these fears. The theme of 
immortality is ancient and constant, with the immortal substance changing 
from an embodied form to a disembodied soul as man's understanding of his 
own makeup advanced. Probably more people in Western world history, and 
even more people alive today, have believed that death means the 
irreversible loss of the soul from the body than any other concept of death. 
Classical Greek thinkers, Christian and most secular Western thought, until 
recently, have held that "the soul was the animating principle of thought and 
action in man and was identified with mental, emotional and sometimes (but 
not always) with spiritual functions. It was nonmaterial, but nevertheless a 
metaphysical reality."(192, at p. 309) And loss of this soul meant the loss 
of animation and consequent death. 
But what of the diagnosis of death when death means the moment 
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when the soul leaves the body. As Robert Veatch explains, there is no easy 
test to analyze whether the soul has left the body [see 192 pp. 21-55] and 
certainly no test that the early Greeks practiced. Concomitant with the 
evolution of interpretation of death, there were also centuries of 
observation of death. Generations of repeated trials of resuscitation and 
observation allowed man to discover the association between death (failure 
to revive) and loss of respiration and heartbeat. Once death was interpreted 
as a time when the soul left the body, the concepts of life and spirit were 
linked to breath and air. The Hebrew 'roach’ means "spirit" or "breath of 
life"; the Sanskrit 'atman' means "breath" or "soul"; in Swahili 'roho' means 
"soul" or "breath"; in Chinese 'ch'i' means "vapor," "breath," "primal aura," or 
"vital fluid."(78) Indeed in modern English, one way to say a person has died 
is to say that he or she has "expired," a word rooted in the same word from 
which the English language derives "spirit," "inspire" and "respiration." Not 
only did life begin and end with first and last breath, but immortality, the 
soul, the divine aspect of every human being, is also associated with 
breathing and breath. Earliest biblical sources recognized the ability to 
breathe independently as a prime index of life and of the installation of the 
soul. "And the Lord had fashioned man of dust of the earth and instilled in 
his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living creature." (Genesis 
2:7) in medieval Christian art, the soul is sometimes depicted escaping out 
of the body with the last breath. 
The Bible also makes reference to another indicator of life, the 
heartbeat transmitted by blood. Deuteronomy 12:23 declares that "the blood 
is the life;" Leviticus 17:14 that "the life of all flesh is the blood thereof." 
And we are commanded to love the Lord our God with all our hearts, souls, 
minds and strength. (Luke 10:27) Since the pulse was associated with life, 

the absence of a pulse naturally was associated with death. Absence of 
heartbeat was detected either by palpation of pulses or by direct 
auscultation of heartsounds and was therefore a less accessible sign of 
death than was the absence of breathing which could be directly observed 
without having to touch the body in question.(139, at pp. 847-61.) 
When modern man secularized his philosophical understanding of his 
nature, he had to find another more biological formulation of what it meant 
to be dead. In answer to the question, "What is it about human life that its 
loss is so essential, the individual who loses it ought to be called dead?," 
modern man began to give answers focusing on the heart and lungs. Instead 
of these signs being indicators of the presence or absence of the soul, they 
became indicators of life itself. Visual and tactile observations of 
respiration, pulse and heart beat were easily enough identified. These 
measures could be supplemented by refinements (holding a cold mirror in 
front of a patient's mouth to detect minimal respiratory exchange, sticking 
a pin in him to check for bleeding) as they were developed and became 
available (e.g. electrocardiography, angiography).(114, at p. 252) Harvey’s 
discovery of circulation and later discoveries of the interrelation between 
respiration, oxygen, hemoglobin, circulation and metabolism cemented the 
concept of the association of absence of vital signs, breath and pulse, with 
death. Of course, some skepticism remained especially in light of the 
possibility of a delayed spontaneous recovery. There was a fairly 
widespread fear of being buried alive, even when all detectable vital signs 
of life had ceased. The practice of holding a "death watch" was intended, in 
part, to offer a last opportunity for the unresponsive figure on the death bed 
to show some sign of revival.(102, at p. 32) Likewise primitive alarm 
systems were developed which were installed in tombs or coffins, to enable 
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the "deceased," if not dead, to signal watchers and be rescued. The danger of 
grave-robbing to provide bodies for anatomical study reinforced the custom 
of the dead watch during the Renaissance. And although time and medical 
and social progress have dispelled the fear, the custom persists of tapping 
on the Pope's forehead with a silver hammer to ensure that he is in fact 
dead.(114, at p. 252) Despite these fears and skepticism, the concept of 
vital sign death remained largely in place until the beginning of the 
Twentieth Century. 
The notion of cell theory established in the 1830's by Schwann and 
Schleidel led inevitably to the recognition that different cells had different 
natural life spans and that, therefore, death could no longer be regarded as a 
single event uniformly affecting the whole body. A concept first of cell 
death and then of organ death distinct from the demise of the organism 
slowly developed.(114, at p. 252) The rate at which cells died and likewise 
could be resuscitated depended on that cell's susceptibility to hypoxia. 
Organs died, cell by cell, and eventually reached a point of no return when 
the integrated function of that organ could no longer return following 
resumption of oxygen, or resuscitation. Death, then, was no longer 
identified as the absence of functional lungs and heart but rather the loss of 
the ability to deliver oxygen to tissues and cells. When the heart and lungs 
stopped working, oxygen could not be delivered to the body's organs and 
these organs eventually died, albeit bit by bit and at different times. 
As scientists discovered more which broadened our understanding of 
death, significant advances were being made in how to maintain and 
resuscitate life. World War I saw the evolution of blood transfusion as a 
means of resuscitation for victims of hemorrhage and shock. The 
discoveries made during the years prior to the war of the Landsteiner blood 
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groups as compatibility factors and of sodium citrate as an anticoagulant 
realized the hope that blood replacement could remedy blood loss. After the 
war, poliomyelitis epidemics spawned great interest in tank respirators. In 
1918, G.N. Stewart and J. M.Rozoff, and in 1928, P. Drinker and C.F. McKhann 
developed respirators for those suffering from bulbarspinal paralysis. These 
respirators were comprised of a chamber that encased the whole body of a 
patient except his head and neck. Alternating the air pressure within this 
chamber caused the diaphragm to move up and down, moving air in and out of 
the lungs. These respirators provided supportive therapy which allowed for 
an extended (and in some cases indefinite) amount of time for healing.(183, 
at p. 2211) After World War II, medicine and medical science advanced 
rapidly, partly, at least, in response to the increased carnage that resulted 
from the World Wars. In 1956, Zoll etal. described the use of externally 
applied countershock to terminate ventricular fibrillation.(206) By 1960, 
mouth-to-mouth ventilation(169) and closed-chest massage(105) had also 
been described. Methods for controlling cerebral edema were also 
proliferating.(114, at p. 252) During the Korean War (1950-1953), many new 
kinds of ventilatory devices were developed which could be attached 
directly to a tube in the patient's trachea. These new respirators were much 
lighter, simpler and less expensive than the earlier respirators of the 1930s 
as a means of providing mechanical assistance to ventilation. It became 
much simpler to maintain respiration in a person whose own diaphragm had 
ceased to function. 
These advances rendered the concept of vital sign death somewhat 
archaic. A patient whose respiratory center or diaphragm is permanently 
destroyed and who is maintained on a ventilator is still alive. A patient 
whose lungs are permanently destroyed and who is maintained on a blood 
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oxygenator is still alive. Furthermore, the hypothetical person whose lungs 
and heart are permanently destroyed but who is maintained on a heart-lung 
machine would still be considered alive. Clearly, since respirations and 
pulses could be maintained from without, the lack of spontaneous breathing 
and heartbeat were no longer easily equated with death. Furthermore, it was 
now clear that all vital functions do not cease at the same time, nor do the 
organs which perform these vital functions die at the same time. More 
troubling was the problem created by resuscitation. Since different tissues 
and, likewise, organs have different susceptibilities to hypoxia and also 
resuscitation, the point at which resuscitation was initiated and how well 
it reversed hypoxia established which tissues would survive and which 
would not. With the advent of advanced resuscitation techniques, it became 
possible for the heart and lungs to survive major deprivations of oxygen and 
for the individual to recover cardiopulmonary function but not necessarily 
recover the function of other organs which were more susceptible than the 
heart to the effects of hypoxia. The fragile tissues of the central nervous 
system, especially, often lacked the requisite resiliency: 
".. .at least 20% of long term cardiac arrest survivors 
suffer permanent brain damage ..., ranging from 
intellectual and emotional changes ... and other focal 
neurologic deficits to the vegetative state and 
permanent coma." (170) 
Thus, it also became apparent that the restoration of vital signs did 
not necessarily mean a return to being lively or "alive." As the definition of 
death became more and more obscure so did determining what were 
appropriate resuscitative measures. 
In 1957, Pope Pius XII published an allocution on the Prolongation of 
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Life. Among the many significant statements contained in this document, 
two were of special import. The first was that the pronouncement of death 
was not the province of the church but the responsibility of the physician: 
"It remains for the doctor... to give a clear and precise definition of 'death' 
and the 'moment of death' of a patient who passes away in a state of 
unconsciousness." The second point was that there came a time in the 
course of a patient's disease where the situation was hopeless and death 
should not be opposed by extraordinary means; in "futile" cases, 
resuscitative measures could be discontinued and death be unopposed. It 
was at this time that "modernized, technological" death and associated 
problems became the subject of increasing general and scientific interest. 
Historically, this proclamation initiated the surge in concept development, 
research, application and controversy in the use of the construct "brain 
death."(104, at pp. 28-29) 
During 1959, several groups of French neurophysiologists were 
involved with research in patients who were in deep states of unresponsive 
coma, in which the absence of spontaneous respiration necessitated the use 
of a respirator. The patients were also areflexic. The results of these 
studies were published by Fischgold and Mathis(64), Jouvet(96), and Mollaret 
and Goulon(132). The concept of brain death seems to have been introduced 
by the latter authors who coined the phrase "coma depasse." Some of the 
patients they studied showed no electrical activity in the brain and were 
therefore considered to be "beyond coma." Extensive brain damage was found 
on post mortem examination. Other researchers performed EEGs as well as 
multiple electrophysiologic recordings from the surface of the cortex and 
deep structures of the cerebrum such as the thalamus. The finding of absent 
electrophysiologic activity was considered by these investigators as 

43 
confirmation of irreversible nonfunction of the brain. 
It became increasingly evident that the critical function was no 
longer heart and lung activity. Rather, the assertion was made that the 
activity of the heart and lung, respiration and circulation, maintained the 
brain and that the heart, lungs and brain were interdependent and the loss of 
function of any one of these three vital organs caused the irreversible 
failure of the other two organs leading to death in minutes. It was also 
increasingly understood that in the past cessation of heartbeat and 
spontaneous respiration always produced prompt death of the brain, and 
similarly, destruction of the brain resulted in prompt cessation of 
respiration and circulation and in this context it was reasonable that 
absence of pulse and respiration were the traditional and appropriate 
criteria for pronouncement of death.(194, at p. 417) However, it was also 
becoming increasingly evident that with the current tools of resuscitation, 
cessation of heartbeat and spontaneous respiration did not always produce 
death of the brain and that medical technology could interfere with the 
interdependence of these vital organs. Patients who suffered from the 
syndrome of "coma depasse", whose bodies were being maintained with the 
support of ventilators and other life-support equipment, presented a 
disquieting paradox to those responsible for their care and to those who 
were close to them during life. Although these patients were without 
consciousness or evidence of brain activity, their chests moved up and down 
rhythmically, their hearts continued to pump oxygenated blood, thereby 
causing their skin to retain warmth and color, and they produced urine and 
were physiologically capable of reproduction. While this state of 
physiologic life did not continue indefinitely, patients with no evidence of 
brain activity maintained cardiopulmonary functions for as long as 68 days. 
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Thus, with great advances in resuscitation which were made in the 1950s 
came an inevitable need to define its indications and its utility. 
The 1950s were also a watershed period in another field of medicine; 
the practice of organ transplantation/ In 1947, Dr. David Hume described the 
removal of a cadaveric kidney and its subsequent attachment to a young 
woman with postpartum kidney failure (the renal artery and vein were 
sutured to the brachial vessels). Although the kidney provided temporary 
dialysis long enough for the woman to recover, Dr. Hume could not achieve 
other successful cadaver transplants due to rejection. Then, two important 
observations were made. First, a renal autograft performed in dogs would 
function normally and denervation of the kidney produced no apparent 
dysfunction. Second, identical twins would not reject tissue from one 
another. These observations led to the realization that renal 
transplantation might be feasible if carried out between identical twins. On 
December 23,1954, Dr. Joseph Murray and colleagues performed a living 
related donor kidney transplant between two brothers at the Peter Bent 
Brigham Hospital. Because the two were identical twins, graft rejection did 
not occur. The transplanted kidney functioned immediately and both 
brothers were discharged well and in good health some weeks later. Despite 
the success of this first transplant operation, the immediate clinical 
impact was minimal because of the obvious limitation of requiring 
individuals with chronic renal failure to be so fortunate as to have an 
identical twin. Nonetheless, the notion that diseased organs could be 
replaced with new ones caught the imagination of the surgical world and 
was the driving force behind the then, new and rapidly growing field of 
organ and tissue transplantation.(57, at pp. 507-8) 
The next great advancement in the science of transplantation was in 

1959 with the use of organs from nonidentical twins and then in 1962 with 
the development of azathioprine. Since the first living related transplant 
operation in 1954, the procedure had been used infrequently during the next 
eight years, (and when it was used it was primarily in identical twins) 
because of the complications of allograft rejection. However, this changed 
when Caine and Murray noted that azathioprine was an effective 
immunosuppressive agent for prolonging survival of canine renal allografts. 
The drug was then used in the treatment of renal allografts in recipients of 
nonidentical living related donors and, more significantly, in the recipients 
of cadaver kidneys with impressive results. Starzl soon thereafter 
recognized that graft rejection could be reversed by combining high dose 
prednisone with azathioprine. These two drugs became the cornerstone of 
renal transplant immunosuppression for the next 15 years. By 1965 and 
1966, many transplant centers had begun the human use of heterologous 
antilymphocytic sera combined with azathioprine and prednisone as a means 
of inducing graft acceptance in the early posttransplantation course.(57, at 
p. 510) 
Living donor transplantation, as the term implies, requires that a 
kidney be given to a recipient who is fortunate enough to have a willing 
friend or relative as a donor. The advent of azathioprine, however, opened 
the door to the use of cadaveric organs. With the ability to use cadaveric 
organs came the development of liver and heart transplantation. Not 
surprisingly it was the medical achievement of transplanting hearts which 
aroused the most discussion and controversy among both the public and 
medical communities. As one ethicist writes, "the site of love and the 
habitat of the soul - celebrated in the poetry and psalms of all ages - had 
now been replaced by a simple pump. What is man now that the heart had 

46 
been reduced to a replaceable muscle? .. .Not only in love poetry but in 
scripture and religious song, the heart has spiritual as well as physiological 
importance."(150, at p. 33) So while the surgeons developed their art of 
cutting and suturing hearts, a procedure they viewed as an obvious "next 
step" in patient care, society began to question the meanings of life and 
death. 
Throughout the rest of the 1960's, cadaveric organ transplantation 
was primarily limited to medical centers located in areas of greater 
population density where there were large numbers of trauma patients with 
fatal neurologic injuries. By the mid 1960s, with the increasing use of 
ventilators, improved endotracheal intubation and the development of 
intensive care units, general surgeons and neurosurgeons were becoming 
increasingly confronted with the long term management of patients with 
severe intracranial injuries and absence of spontaneous respiration. At that 
time, there were no available criteria to determine the probability of 
neurologic recovery; ventilatory support continued until infection 
intervened and caused the patient’s death. These patients created a great 
deal of psychological ambivalence among next-of-kin and the medical 
personnel who cared for them. They also generated interest among those 
associated with the organ retrieval process. Were these patients dead in 
some way even though their vital signs were being artificially maintained? 
Could those patients with "respirator brains" who were "beyond coma" be 
dead, and if so, how could that be determined? 
The first discussions of brain death as synonymous with death of the 
patient were held at a Ciba Symposium in 1966. At that meeting, Alexandre 
suggested that organs could be removed from an individual with an intact 
circulation if there was absolute evidence of brain death which he argued 
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could be determined by cerebral angiography that displayed the absence of 
cerebral blood fiow.(2, at p. 69) Soon thereafter, the concept of brain death 
became an actively discussed issue in the United States, but its acceptance 
did not come easily. In 1968, Henry Beecher assembled the Ad Hoc 
Committee of the Harvard Medical School to examine the definition of brain 
death. Their landmark report, "A definition of irreversible coma," is now 
generally regarded as the "first widely recognized index that current 
medical concepts about the definition of death were changing."(194, at p. 
426) In past times, the Harvard report said, "the obvious criterion of no 
heartbeat as synonymous with death was sufficiently accurate... .[but] this 
is no longer valid when modern resuscitative and supportive measures are 
used. These improved activities can now restore 'life' as judged by the 
ancient standards of persistent respiration and continuing heartbeat.... Our 
primary purpose is to define irreversible coma as a new criterion for 
death."(54) The report then went on to fix a plurality of tests to determine 
brain death, so that it could be judged that it was no longer a Nfe being 
maintained, but only a corpse or only organs if transplant was in view.s 
Since 1968, the validity of these criteria has been established in 
several ways. These validations include the substantial morphologic 
evidence that, when the criteria have been fulfilled, there is widespread 
destruction of the brain. Richardson has found that the brains of 128 
patients meeting the Harvard criteria showed extensive destructive 
changes.(154) Another validation derives from cooperative studies of the 
value of EEG and neurologic examination in the determination of complete 
brain destruction. In these studies, members of the American 
Electroencephalographic society and of EEG societies in Europe were 
questioned. Oh the 2642 cases under study, there was no instance of 
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recovery in a patient who fulfilled the Harvard criteria.(179,180) 
Furthermore, since 1970, there have been no adequately documented 
examples in which the Harvard criteria could be considered invalid.(119) 
Subsequent to the Harvard Committee's report, various groups in the 
U.S. and throughout the world have elaborated on the Harvard criteria or 
formulated other criteria. In 1971, several authorities showed that spinal 
reflexes including withdrawal movements may persist after complete 
destruction of the brain which challenged the Harvard committee's 
requirement of absence of spinal reflexes.(131) In 1972, the Task Force on 
Death and Dying of the Institute of Society and Ethics and the Life Sciences 
elaborated by specifying that the Harvard Criteria should not replace the 
traditional means of determining death but instead should be used to 
complement it.(154) Between 1970 and 1972, 503 comatose patients from a 
nine hospital cooperative study were analyzed prospectively for brain death. 
This study gave definitive criteria, like the Harvard study, but the 
appropriate interval for reexamination was shortened to six from 24 
hours.(11) In 1978, Black reviewed the acceptance of brain death as death. 
He noted the advancements in technology which allowed less strict criteria 
to determine total brain destruction but also emphasized that "the entity 
brain death [should] not be confused with prolonged vegetative 
existence."(29) 
In addition to scientific advancements in the study of brain death, 
there were also important changes in the legal understanding of brain death 
following the publication of the Harvard criteria. Before this time, the 
traditional legal definition of death had been consistent with the prevailing 
medical concept that death was determined by cessation of the vital 
functions of respiration and heartbeat. This is reflected in the Common Law 

49 
definition of death as stated in the Fourth edition of Black's Law Dictionary 
published in 1968, "The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by 
physicians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a 
cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as 
respiration, pulsation, etc."(30, at p. 488) But in 1970, the first attempt at 
state legislation on brain death was enacted in Kansas. The statute 
established two alternative "definitions of death:" permanent absence of 
spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function, and permanent absence of 
spontaneous brain activity. The specific criteria were left to "ordinary 
standards of medical practice."(154, at p. 52) In 1972, the impact of 
current medical thinking on case law had become evident in a Virginia case, 
Tucker v. Lower. In a wrongful death action, it was alleged that an 
individual was not dead at the time that his heart and kidneys were removed 
for purposes of transplantation. The court rejected a motion for a summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that the court was bound 
by the common law definition of death until it was changed by state 
legislature (as in Kansas). However, after considerable debate, the court 
instructed the jury that it might properly consider, as a substitute for the 
traditional criteria for determining the time of death, "the time of complete 
and irreversible loss of all function of the brain.. .whether or not the 
aforesaid functions [respiration and circulation] were spontaneous or were 
being maintained artificially or mechanically." 
In August of 1978, a model Uniform Brain Death Act was adopted by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the 
United States. This act specified that: "For legal and medical purposes, an 
individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of the 
brain, including the brainstem, is dead. A determination under this section 
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must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards." In a 
comment on the Uniform Brain Death Act, the Commissioners stated that 
"the act does not preclude a determination of death under other legal and 
medical criteria , including the traditional criteria of cessation of 
respiration and circulation."(186, at p. 240) 
Another important development was the change in the position of the 
American Medical Association away from opposition to statutory definitions 
of death. This opposition was based on a belief that there was no need for 
such laws. In 1977, this opposition softened and in December 1979, largely 
as a result of added pressure from organizations representing neurologists 
and neurosurgeons, this opposition was entirely reversed, and a Model Act to 
provide for the determination of death was adopted by the AMA House of 
delegates. The important sections of this act read: 
An individual who has sustained either 1) irreversible 
cessation of circulatory or respiratory functions, or 
2)irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire 
brain, shall be considered dead. A determination of 
death shall be made in accordance with accepted 
medical standards. A physician or any other person 
authorized by law to determine death who makes such 
determination in accordance with (the above) is not 
liable for damages in any civil action or subject to 
prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his acts or 
the acts of others based on that determination. (186, 
at p. 242) 
In May 1980, representatives of the American Medical Association, 
American Bar Association, and the National Conference of Commissioners of 
Uniform State Laws reached agreement on a Uniform Determination of Death 
Act. This new uniform determination read: 
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An individual who has sustained either 1 irreversible 
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or 
2)irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire 
brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A 
determination of death must be made in accordance 
with accepted medical standards.(190) 
In 1981, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research published its 
book entitled Defining Death. Included in the book were guidelines on how to 
define brain death as well as criteria for the determination of brain death.1 
By proposing this carefully considered statute, the President's Commission 
made a valuable contribution to health care policy which endorsed the 
acceptance of the Universal Determination of Death Act of 1980. It is 
interesting that the Commission disavowed the need . .to resolve all the 
differences among the leading concepts of death..." that influenced it 
recommendations. The Commission noted that "philosophic refinement 
beyond a certain point may not be necessary..." for the purpose of public 
policy. The statute rested, therefore, at the level of "generalized 
physiologic standards" for recognizing death, and avoided a commitment to 
one specific concept of what it means for a human to die. However, in the 
section of the report specifically devoted to a discussion of the meaning of 
death, the Commission seemed to favor the concept of death which focuses 
on the ability of the organism to function as a whole; to integrate, regulate 
and organize important organ systems is an organism's essential quality, the 
irreversible loss of which constitutes death.(203, at p. 252) 
Shortly after the publication of the Commission's report, the 
anencephalic debate commenced and began to question whether the notion of 
the irreversible loss of bodily integrative ability was really the sine qua 
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non of death. Were the brainstem reflexes fundamental to what we consider 
life? Was it time to reexamine the criteria by which we measure death, to 
reject the whole-brain oriented Harvard criteria in favor of a consciousness 
and social interaction based scale? 
We have traced the evolution of defining the criteria of death and the 
philosophical and cultural meanings behind those criteria. In general terms, 
an entity is considered dead when there is a complete change in the status 
of that entity characterized by the irreversible loss of those 
characteristics that are essentially significant to it. Throughout history, in 
various times and cultures, many answers have been given to the question of 
what is essentially significant to human life. Four basic answers surfaced 
in this review. Each involves the irreversible loss of some essential 
characteristic. The four essential characteristics are (1) the presence of 
the soul, (2) the flowing of 'vital' body fluids, (3) the capacity for bodily 
integration and (4) the capacity of consciousness and social interaction. 
The concept of death as synonymous with loss of the soul, although still an 
important philosophical concept, was displaced within the scientific 
community when man's understanding of anatomy and physiology challenged 
religious and spiritual beliefs. The concept of death as synonymous with the 
loss of the vital functions of respiration and circulation was displaced in 
1968 within the scientific community when man's understanding of 
resuscitative technology and brain function challenged the traditional 
standards of cardiorespiratory measurements. And now, man’s struggle to 
understand the higher cortical functions of consciousness and thought and to 
provide appropriate and responsible medical care (i.e. organ transplantation) 
have begun to challenge the current standards of brain death. Some critics 
argue that the departure from the concept of "vital sign death" to "bodily 
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integration death" was not a true revision of the meaning of death but, 
rather, a revision in the measurement of death since cardiovascular, 
respiratory, and brain activity are known to be interdependent and that the 
cessation of one certainly would mean the cessation of the others without 
invention. The Harvard criteria did not replace but, rather, complemented 
the traditional criteria for determining death. Where the latter can be 
clearly established, they are still determinative.(154, at p. 50) Other 
critics argue that "brain death" was actually a radical departure from the 
traditional concept of death because the physician no longer was making his 
decision for the benefit of the patient but rather "for the benefit of the 
family, society and (in the case of organ transplantation) for another 
patient."(187, at p. 603) Another critic concluded, "shifts in criteria do not 
leave everything ethically and legally as it was before. If there are 
scientific and therapeutic motives for shifting the criteria (for example, to 
provide more material for research, or more and better organs for 
transplantation), then it must be the case that under new criteria the person 
who is dead will be more useful than before."(163, at p. 41) 
It is interesting that many of these statements closely resemble the 
current arguments in the anencephalic debate. The Harvard criteria met 
with some debate, but eventually forged the path for important statutes and 
legislation which permitted transplant operations to save countless lives. 
The anencephalic debate has gradually waned in intensity and has produced 
no significant legislation and consequently no clinical contributions. Were 
the Harvard criteria really just a formulation of an alternative way to 
diagnose the traditional concept of cardiorespiratory death (and thus easier 
to accept) or were they the radical redefinition of death that the critics 
mentioned above argue? Has the original intent of the Ad Hoc Committee at 
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Harvard been maintained over the last 24 years? Did the Ad Hoc Committee 




IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE AD HOC COMMITTEE 
The preceding reviews of the anencephalic debate and of death's 
historical evolution reveals that society and its scholars have reached an 
unhappy plateau of inertia. Those proponents of a higher brain-based 
definition of death have been met by immovable supporters of the Ad Hoc 
Committee's whole brain-based criteria. The anencephalic debate has 
been tabled in most hospital ethics committees for lack of direction and 
for fear of negative publicity. Let us now return to the document itself, 
the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of Brain 
Death, and to an analysis of papers of the Committee's Chairman, Dr. 
Henry Beecher. I believe that a careful study of the Committee's intent 
will provide direction for the anencephalic debate. 
The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the Definition of 
Brain Death stated in its first sentence that "Our purpose is to define 
irreversible coma as a new criterion for death."(54) The authors cited 
two reasons for the need for a definition: (1) to deal with the burden the 
irreversibly brain damaged patient inflicts on himself, his family, his 
medical caregivers, and society and (2) to resolve the controversy which 
can accompany organ donation for transplantation. The report then went 
on to outline the characteristics of irreversible coma which included 
determinations of cerebral, higher brain function (unreceptivity and 
unresponsitivity) and brainstem function (no spontaneous breathing, no 
reflexes). However, when speaking of irreversible coma, there was 
uncertainty regarding the distinction between brain death as opposed to 
irreversible coma. Likewise it was unclear whether the authors referred 
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to brain death or cerebral death. Certainly, the inclusion of brainstem 
reflexes as objective criteria would suggest that the authors attributed 
significance to the brainstem. But some suggest that since there are no 
precise and accurate measures of the irreversible loss of consciousness 
and higher brain function, the Harvard criteria merely provided the 
safest, closest and most technically precise measurements.(192, at p. 
314) In order to understand the true intent of the Harvard criteria, the 
criteria on which legislation and statutes are based, and upon which the 
current anencephalic debate hinges, it is important to understand the 
influences under which the the members of the Ad Hoc committee 
operated, the questions they hoped to answer, and what they believe their 
response, in the form of the Harvard criteria, was. 
The late 1960's was the setting for the development of two 
astonishing advancements in clinical medicine, intensive care and heart 
transplantation. As outlined in earlier chapters, these developments 
were part of continuums in medical technology and surgical and 
pharmacologic techniques, but their accomplishments in terms of how 
they effected the public at large were watershed. Newspapers were 
filled with accounts of how individuals were having death kept at bay by 
respirators and intensive care technology and how others were having 
death kept at bay by the installation of organs to replace their diseased 
ones. But with the complexities and intricacies of intensive 
resuscitative techniques came some failures. Families and caregivers 
kept watch by the bedside of patients with no apparent consciousness or 
responsiveness but who breathed and whose hearts beat. Were these 
people still "alive"? With the wonder and awe that transplantation 
inspired came also a sense of fear. Where were the organs coming from? 
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Following the first heart transplantation, there appeared in the 
medical literature and in the popular press a series of articles calling for 
clarification of the criteria for determining death. Some called for an 
"updating" of the criteria to facilitate the work of the intensivists (the 
declaring of death) and to facilitate the work of the transplant surgeons 
(the taking of organs). Others asked for the establishment of agreed-upon 
guidelines to protect the integrity of the donor against possible 
premature organ removal or to protect the physician against possible 
charges of malpractice, or even homicide.(154, at p. 512) In a widely 
celebrated article in Harper's magazine, the author asked whether 
transplantation was not actually a modern twist of harvesting the 
dead.(89) An editorial in the Wall Street Journal offered this view of the 
situation: 
"The issue of [defining death] is as deep as the old, 
near-universal human fear of waking up in a coffin. 
In recent years, it has acquired newly macabre forms. 
Mechanical respirators are making it possible to 
sustain a body's breathing well past its natural point 
of expiration. This enables people to begin worrying 
about whether the plug will get pulled on a human 
who otherwise would have lived to recover some day. 
The improving technology of organ transplants makes 
the fear more vivid. Someone will now have a real 
reason to pull that plug."(200) 
In 1957, Pope Pius XII had attempted to sort out some of the 
confusion over the gray areas of death and resuscitation in an address, 
"The Prolongation of Life." Some conclusions stand out. (1) In a deeply 
unconscious individual whose vital functions are maintained over a 
prolonged period only by extraordinary means, "the soul may already have 
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left the body." Verification of the moment of death can be definitely 
determined only by a physician. It is not "within the competence of the 
Church" to decide this. (2) It is incumbent on the physician to take all 
reasonable ordinary means of restoring the spontaneous vital functions 
and consciousness and to employ such extraordinary means as are 
available to achieve this end. It is not obligatory, however, to continue 
to use extraordinary means indefinitely in hopeless cases. "But normally 
one is held to use only ordinary means - according to circumstances of 
persons, places, times, and cultures - that is to say, means that do not 
involve any grave burden for oneself or another."(145) The assumptions 
were made that life is present as long as vital functions persist 
spontaneously or even with some help from artificial processes and that 
there comes a time when resuscitative efforts should stop and death be 
unopposed. This message must have comforted members of the Roman 
Catholic Church but, no doubt, fear and skepticism persisted. 
It was in this setting of great advancements in resuscitation and 
transplantation (with the consequent problems for hospitals of "keeping 
alive" people with irreversible brain damage and of accessing organs for 
transplantation), growing public fear of being buried alive or of having 
their organs "snatched," and also the radical concept that the soul might 
have left the body before the heart stopped beating that the Harvard Ad 
Hoc Committee began its deliberations. Dr. Robert Ebert, the Dean of 
Harvard Medical School, echoed these influences in the letter in which he 
proposed the Ad Hoc Committee. 
"At a recent meeting of the Standing Committee on 
Human Studies, Dr. Henry K. Beecher reviewed some 
basic material on the ethical problems created by the 
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hopelessly unconscious man. His presentations 
reemphasized to me the necessity of giving further 
consideration to the definition of brain death. As you 
are aware, many of the ethical problems associated 
with transplantation and other developing areas of 
medicine hinge on appropriate definition. With its 
pioneering interest in organ transplantation, I believe 
the faculty of the Harvard Medical School is better 
equipped to elucidate this area than any other single 
group."(22, Letter to Ralph Potter from Robert Ebert, 
February 2,1968) 
The Committee was assembled in February of 1968 and had its 
first meeting on March 14,1968. The Chairman of the Committee was Dr. 
Henry K. Beecher, Dorr Professor of Anesthesia at Harvard Medical School. 
He was described by former colleague Dr. Ralph Potter as "a medical 
person with ethical responsibilities, not much philosophical perspective, 
but a real drive to get things done."(148) Professor William Curran, a 
member of the Ad Hoc Committee and Professor of Health Law at Harvard 
Law School, remembers that the primary purpose of the Committee as 
outlined at the first meeting was to find a solution of "how to deal with 
the heart attack and trauma patients who were in irreversible coma and 
were being 'kept alive' much to the concern of hospitals and 
families."(52) He remembers being told that because there were no 
criteria for stopping heart-lung machines, a conflict was growing 
between the caretakers and the "technology movers," the surgeons, that 
required guidance and resolution. He remembers that the Committee was 
not created in order "to specifically identify criteria that would increase 
the supply of organs for transplantation but [they] were meant to 
consider the issue" during the deliberations. Dr. Ralph Potter, another 
member of the Ad Hoc Committee, and a Professor at Harvard Divinity 
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School, remembers that Dr. Beecher was "preoccupied with the public fear 
of organ snatching.... and from the beginning believed that the sooner we 
could come to some conclusions, the better."(148) 
By July 3,1968, the report had gone through five rough drafts and 
had been submitted to the Dean of Harvard Medical School and the 
publisher of the Journal of the American Medical Association. As 
outlined in previous chapters, within two years the criteria were the 
basis of state law in Kansas and within twelve years had been 
incorporated into the Uniform Determination of Death Act. These 
statutes were certainly derived from the words of the Report, but were 
they consonant with the intent of the Ad Hoc Committee? What exactly 
had the Committee hoped to accomplish? How had they responded to the 
needs of the public, in terms of allaying the fears of "being buried alive"? 
How had they responded to the medical community in finding a solution 
for the "irreversibly brain damaged patient," and in facilitating organ 
transplantation? What did it mean "to define irreversible coma as a new 
criterion for death"? 
After reading the personal papers of Dr. Beecher and speaking with 
the surviving members of the Ad Hoc Committee, it is my conclusion that 
the intent of Dr. Beecher and the Ad Hoc Committee was to provide a 
definition of death that would allay the fears of the public and facilitate 
organ transplantation. I also believe that Dr. Beecher and the Committee 
intended a radical redefinition in terms of the organic component of 
death, i.e. the irreversible loss of higher brain function, but this radical 
proposition was based on the traditional belief of a non-organic 
component of death, i.e. the irreversible loss of the soul. Let me examine 
each of these statements individually. 
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Dr. Ralph Potter and Dr. Robert Levine, two of Dr. Beecher's former 
colleagues, have suggested that the familiar themes of fear of being 
buried alive and of organ snatching figured importantly in Beecher’s 
thoughts. In a letter to Dr. Daniel Callahan, Dr. Beecher wrote, "Just now 
I am working on an article with the title, 'Fear of Death as a Cause of 
Death.' An abundance of material is available on this!"(22, Letter to 
Daniel Callahan from Henry Beecher, April 28,1971) It seems that he 
believed these fears would lead to restrictive legislation that would 
impede if not completely halt the then burgeoning field of 
transplantation. As he wrote in an unpublished paper entitled "Some 
Consequences of Death," 
"The present shortages of organs for transplantation 
reminds one of the times 130 years or so ago when 
medical schools were trying desperately to get 
enough cadavers for teaching purposes. The grave 
robbers, the "resurrectionists," did their best to 
supply the demands of the market place. They were 
inadequate; so the Edinburgh murderers, Burke and 
Hare, entered the scene. They supplied fresh 
cadavers on demand, and a new word was coined. It 
was called getting 'Burked.' The unethical act, 
murder, led finally to restrictive legislation, the 
Anatomy Act of 1832, a sequence one can often 
observe when less ethical violations occur than 
murder. 
"When Woodruff set about organizing a skin bank 
in Scotland, he discovered that under the Anatomy 
Act of 1832, precipitated by Burke and Hare, it was 
illegal to proceed. Finally, the need for a skin bank 
was appreciated and the situation set right by the 
passage in 1961 of the Human Tissue Act. 
"Another example of the crippling power of the 
courts was demonstrated in the 1932 case of a rich 
man who bought a testicle from a young Neapolitan. 
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A surgeon transplanted It with the result that article 
5 of the Italian common code of civil rights was 
promulgated in 1940. This forbade the donation of 
organs or other parts of the body that could produce a 
permanent deficiency in the donor.. .A more 
enlightened bill is currently before the Italian 
Parliament.. .(One wonders if ever there will be a 
black market in organs.)"(emphasis added)(22) 
Another example of misguided legislation that was borne out of the fear 
of being buried alive and later used to restrict medical advancements 
was the Massachusetts Grave Robbing Statute of 1814. In 1971, four 
doctors at Boston City Hospital began a study of the way pregnant 
women metabolize common antibiotics. The study involved measuring 
circulating levels of erythromycin and clindamycin in women during and 
after their pregnancies. "As we thought about it, [one of the researcher 
remembers], we realized the safest course would be to get pregnant 
women who were going to have an abortion anyway. There was no 
reason to think that either antibiotic would be harmful to a fetus - each 
is widely used - but it seemed wrong to take any chance."(50, at p. 421) 
The investigators also measured levels of the antibiotics in the aborted 
fetuses in order to discover not only how the mothers handled the 
antibiotics but also whether the drugs crossed the placenta and entered 
fetal tissues. The experiment verified the idea that pregnant women 
metabolize antibiotics differently than nonpregnant women, and it 
showed that clindamycin is more effective in crossing the placenta and 
getting into the fetus than is erythromycin. These were important 
observations and were published in the New England Journal of Medicine, 
7 June 1973. The journal's paper inflamed Boston "right-to-lifers" who 
were extremely concerned about the fact that the experiment had 
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depended on the cooperation of women having abortions and on the legal 
equivalent of autopsies on the dead, aborted fetuses. In July of 1973, 
Massachusetts State Representative Raymond L. Flynn wrote to Boston 
City Councilman Albert O'Neil, complaining about inhumane procedures 
at BCH and other hospitals. He said he spoke for all "right-thinking" 
people who believe that no abortion should be permitted, regardless of 
what the Supreme Court says.(50) O'Neil held hearings on the matter a 
couple of months later. As a result, the district attorney's office was 
called, and on 11 April, 1974, a Boston grand jury indicted the 
researchers for an alleged violation of an 1814 Massachusetts grave 
robbing-law because they had "remove[d] or convey[ed] away a human 
body or remains thereof."(50) Beecher, like many in the medical 
profession, found it intolerable that doctors could be accused of 
grave-robbing. 
Beecher believed that this misplaced fear could be the greatest 
impediment to medical advancements. By developing criteria which 
defined death despite the presence of heartbeat, but consistent with the 
Pope's position that the soul had already left the body, Beecher hoped to 
"define" away this fear. After all, if the soul had left the body and there 
was no hope in returning to a sentient life, there could be nothing 
frightening about the use of one's cadaver organs. In a letter from 
Professor Curran who wrote, 
"The efforts to get a new definition of death are now 
too closely associated with the desire and need for 
donors for single organ (or vital organ) donations for 
transplantation. In the public eye, this smacks of 
'organ snatching' and balancing of one life’s value 
over another. To switch the argument over to a need 
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for scarce hospital beds, or for scarce personnel to 
work on sicker people, or for scarce respirator time, 
is merely to make the same argument: that this 
person's life has become less valuable than some 
undefined other person's life or community 
interest."(22, Letter to Henry Beecher from William 
Curran - January 5, 1970), 
Beecher circled every word "life" and wrote in the margin "But the basic 
premise is that the man is DEAD." Beecher developed further this idea in 
another unpublished paper entitled "The New Definition of Death, Some 
Opposing Views," 
"... it makes no difference at all which criterion of 
death is chosen,..., but the freedom to choose brain 
death is a great gain. While it makes no difference to 
the dead man, it is fraught with material advantages 
for the others concerned."(22) 
The material gains Beecher wrote of included not only the benefits 
to families of allowing them to end their deathwatches but also the 
obvious benefits of transplantation. Leon Kass in a letter critiquing one 
of Beecher’s papers wrote, "The family naturally responds on the dictum 
'where there is life, there is hope.' Thus, to simulate the existence of 
life where none exists, to artificially perpetuate some of the signs of 
life in a corpse, is a cruel and senseless perpetuation of suffering for the 
family. Moreover, the family is delayed and prevented from regrouping 
and reconstituting itself in the face of loss. Most families will be greatly 
relieved to have death honestly and properly declared." To which Beecher 
wrote in the margin, "our experience", "exactly."(22, Letter to Henry 
Beecher from Leon Kass - May 20,1970) 
Let us examine the significance of Beecher’s intent. Can the mere 
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formulation of a definition of death allay fear? Is the doctor-patient 
relationship such that if a physician declares Aunt Matilda dead, her 
family will not challenge that diagnosis? Has there ever been a request 
for a second opinion when death is the diagnosis? Perhaps, as Beecher 
suggests, the family, society, and certainly transplant recipients are 
ready to acknowledge that "for all intents and purposes" Aunt Matilda is 
dead, their responsibility to her and her responsibility to them is 
concluded, her usefulness to herself and to others is ended. One can 
imagine instances when a definitional change would be more difficult to 
accept; if the definition is preposterous or if the definition is acceptable 
but the family or society is not ready to acknowledge the conclusion of 
that person's utility, for example, a primary provider/parent/spouse or an 
important statesman (Robert Kennedy was by current definitions brain 
dead for several hours before cardiorespiratory failure caused his 
demise). This assertion that definitions can allay fear was a radical 
departure from the role of physician-scientist and was an important 
contribution not only to medical policy-making but also to understanding 
the physicians role in creating death's threshold. 
On the subject of transplantation, Beecher was perhaps even more 
taken with the benefits of the brain death criteria than other proponents. 
In the rough draft of an unpublished paper, he wrote, 
"One can hear on all sides "reasons" for the definition 
of brain death as death indeed. Those hostile to the 
concept state, without evidence, that the primary 
motivating interest was to increase the flow of 
organs for transplantation; this is one reason, one of 
several. Since I was actively engaged in formulating 
this definition, I am familiar with the reasons for its 
presentation. There is first, the widely recognized 
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inadequacy of the old definition of death, and second, 
with the advances in science and technology, it has 
become evident that there is a need to redefine death 
in light of these advances. Third, there is indeed a 
life-saving potential in the new definition, for, when 
accepted, it will lead to greater availability than 
formerly of essential organs in viable condition, for 
transplantation, and thus countless lives now 
inevitably lost will be saved... .The philosophers say 
acceptance of the new definition is the camel’s nose 
under the tent. Thus they put a vague philosophical 
view against the here and now of a needless loss of 
uncounted hundreds of lives which might be saved or 
at least prolonged by the use of the organs from a 
body whose brain is dead. This costs nothing to the 
former 'proprietor' of the organs, but it gives life to 
those in need of new organs.. .Finally, the present 
situation points up a momentous change of view: until 
now the dead body has been an unpleasant problem, 
unclear, a dangerous source of disease and if not 
buried properly, likely to come back and haunt you. 
But now, a new era is at hand: for the first time, the 
human body of the newly dead has great potential 
usefulness."(22) 
From these statements, it is clear that Beecher rejected slippery slope 
arguments. He also seems to favor "greatest good" calculations, 
maximizing health and happiness. He actually scorned the opinion that the 
transplantation issue should not enter in the deliberations of defining 
brain death criteria. This utilitarian orientation is echoed in many of his 
writings: 
"The new definition will lead to saving countless 
lives. Isn't this morally desirable? Denial will lead 
to loss... We can be intellectually lazy - morally 
lazy - and avoid controversy by rejecting the new 
definition, simply saying the first two reasons [cited 
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above] are O.K., but why bother. The third reason is a 
spur to acceptance. I, at least, am a pragmatist. 
(things are what their results are)"(22) 
In another rough draft, he elaborates on his opinion that wasted therapy 
is immoral. 
"It is odd that some have considered it indelicate to 
contemplate the material advantages to arise from 
the new definition. The hope, the relief of anxiety of 
the desperately ill and their families is great on 
being informed that the organ needing replacement is 
available. The freedom to use tissues and organs in 
good condition means, on one hand, the saving of 
lives, and on the other, the elimination of waste, 
wasted skill and time and resources and needed bed 
space, waste of money and waste of lives."(22) 
These statements were as radical as the assertions that 
policy-makers could define away fear. To acknowledge openly and to 
insist that transplantation was as an important influence in defining 
death as was being sympathetic to the needs of the patient and of his or 
her family was a radical readjustment in viewing the American ideals of 
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." If we take Beecher at his 
word, we are to believe that there comes a time toward the end of one's 
life, where the patient's life is less valuable than his organs; in a sense 
Beecher advocates a theory of diminishing returns or diminishing utility. 
This is a negation of the absolute value of "life" and of Kantian ethics, no 
longer can a patient be viewed solely as an "ends". 
Thus, it is clear that Beecher was very concerned about 
facilitating transplantation, more so than fellow members of the Ad Hoc 
Committee. But according to Ralph Potter, "The Report was always 
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Henry's, not really a product of the Committee. It was his show and he 
ran it. How else could you get thirteen people to agree on such a big issue 
and publish a paper in five meetings, in five months."(148) There does, 
however, seem to be more of a consensus on what the Committee intended 
when it defined irreversible coma - they intended, unlike its legacy, for 
brain death to be equated with higher cortical, cerebral death. 
Professor Curran remembers,"There was no discussion of cerebral 
vs. whole brain death. We were more practical, mostly a bunch of 
clinicians. We were concerned with a symptom - irreversible loss of 
consciousness. We would have included PVS [persistent vegetative state] 
and anencephaly but we just didn't think about them. We were more 
concerned with the tragedies of life not death."(52) In a letter to 
Beecher dated April 22,1968, Curran writes, "I feel we should limit our 
consideration to the following: A complete and comprehensive set of 
guidelines for the determination of irreversible brain damage resulting in 
virtually total destruction of the personality and total 
unconsciousness."(22, Letter to Henry Beecher from William Curran - 
April 22,1968) Beecher elaborates further in an unpublished paper, 
"The basic question is this, are these hopelessly 
comatose patients really still alive? And the answer 
hinges on whether one holds with Black's Law 
Dictionary that'... death occurs precisely when life 
ceases and does not occur until the heart stops 
beating and respiration ends. Death is not a 
continuous event and is an event that takes place at a 
precise time, ’ or whether one believes that the 
individual's personality, his conscious life, his 
uniqueness, his capacity for remembering, judging, 
reasoning, acting, enjoying, worrying, and so on, 
reside in the brain, and that when the brain no longer 
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functions the individual is dead. We have proof that 
these and other functions reside in the brain,.. .It 
seems clear that when the brain no longer functions, 
when it is destroyed, so also is the individual 
destroyed; he no longer exists as a person: he is dead. 
In the words of Justice Holmes, To live is to 
function. That is all there is to living.'(22) 
Beecher reiterates the importance of consciousness and personality in 
two other unpublished papers. "There is a new need to move death to the 
site of the individual's consciousness, and if loss of consciousness be 
permanent, then to declare death."(22) "Advances in medical knowledge 
and understanding require the orderly recognition that destruction of the 
brain means death of the individual; his uniqueness is centered in the 
brain."(22) And in a letter written a year and a half after the Ad Hoc 
Report to Dr. Robert Ebert, Dean of the Harvard Medical School, "Our 
definition of irreversible coma has been astonishingly widely accepted, 
as you doubtless know... accepted as a definition of the irreversible 
termination of the personality, death of the brain, death indeed."(22, 
Letter from Henry Beecher to Robert Ebert - December 22,1969) In a 
letter where Robert Veatch comments,"! believe that Dr. Beecher sees the 
meaning of death as the loss of consciousness," Beecher writes in the 
margin, "no, loss of consciousness is the result of death." 
To change the definition of death to a higher brain-based standard 
was the most radical of Beecher's intentions. Under this definition, the 
personality of a patient may be irreversibly lost but the appearance of 
life remains; "cadavers" and "corpses" can breathe and have heartbeats. 
Beecher asserts that what is meaningful in society are not the 
appearances of life but rather substantive, sentient, interactive life. 
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This is a restatement of his utility based diminishing returns concept of 
life, where utility is measured by personality and consciousness. This is 
a far cry from measurements of pulse and respiration but perhaps a 
closer approximation to Cartesian dualism and a soul oriented concept of 
life and death. 
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V. THE ANENCEPHALIC DEBATE REVISITED 
At this junction let us return to the anencephalic debate with an 
understanding of the original intent of the brain death criteria. Beecher 
and the Ad Hoc Committee hoped to allay fears of organ-snatching, to 
facilitate organ transplantation and to redefine death to mean the 
irreversible loss of higher cortical function. Clearly, if the the intent of 
the Harvard report had been maintained, there would be no anencephalic 
debate, they would be appropriate donors. There is little public fear in 
harvesting the organs from an anencephalic, rather if anything there is 
pressure from families to use their anencephalic infants' organs in order 
that they can derive something positive from a tragic situation. The 
slippery slope argument against using anencephalics as organ donors is 
rejected under the "intended” Harvard criteria in favor of a "greater good” 
or "diminishing returns on utility" focus. And most importantly, the 
definition of death under the "intended" Harvard criteria includes those 
who have irreversibly loss sentient life. Since the anencephalic never 
achieves sentient life, they meet the criteria of death and their cadaver 
organs can be used for donation. Indeed, although many attest that 
neither Dr. Beecher nor the Harvard Committee ever discussed the 
anencephalic infant, it seems that Dr. Beecher anticipated the debate. 
'There are many levels of death: civilizations can 
fail, yet the component societies live on. Societies 
disintegrate, but individuals survive. Individuals die, 
yet their cells continue to metabolize... Cells can be 
disrupted, yet their ferments remain active. Where 
in this sequence are you going to say death occurred? 
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(Sir Peter Medawar surveyed this situation years ago 
and concluded that man was truly dead who could not 
rise up and litigate.) At whatever level we choose to 
call death, it is an arbitrary decision. Death of the 
heart? The hair still grows. Death of the brain? The 
heart may still beat. The need is to choose an 
irreversible state where the brain no longer 
functions. It is best to choose a level where, 
although the brain is dead, usefulness of other organs 
is still present. This, we have tried to make clear in 
what we have called the new definition of 
death."(emphasis added)(22) 
Furthermore, Beecher and the Ad Hoc Committee would have found 
no dilemma in using the anencephalic donor because, as stated above, 
these infants would never have been invested by a soul when measured by 
the standards of the Catholic Church (the soul is the site of reason, logic, 
empathy, etc.). The authors held to the classical notion that both an 
organic component (called the body) and a nonorganic component (called 
the soul) must be present for a human to be alive. They, in fact, echoed 
the insights of Descartes, that it is not the whole brain that it is the 
locus of the most critical functions of the soul, but only a small part of 
it. In the margin of a paper by Robert Veatch who wrote about "the 
'sacred character' of individual existence," Beecher wrote "as Pius XII so 
clearly said 'Extreme Unction when the soul has fled. The soul and mind 
are one!"(22) 
Thus, we are left with the disquieting question of why statute, 
law and practice have strayed from the original intent of the Harvard Ad 
Hoc Committee and yet their report is defended to the letter. It is clear 
from the preceding analysis that Beecher and the members of the Ad Hoc 
Committee believed and intended that death should be declared when 
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there is permanent loss of consciousness, loss of cortical function. It 
appears that the brainstem was included in the definition of death to 
provide a "safety margin" both for the patient, to be sure of the 
permanence of the loss of cortical function, and for society, to create a 
bridge to the traditional criteria of loss of heartbeat and breath. It 
seems likely that society was (and is) not ready to accept that bodies 
that breathe and whose hearts beat despite their irreversible loss of 
soul, personality and "humanness," were ready for burial or organ 
donation. The fear of being buried alive may still supersede any rational 
appraisal of the "meaning" of death.u But if we consider the 
anencephalic issue, there is no need for a safety margin, the brainstem is 
irrelevant to the anencephalic because there is no question of "loss". The 
anencephalic never achieves consciousness or personality. Therefore, 
society needs to reanalyze the anencephalic issue not in terms of the 
restrictions of the Harvard criteria but in terms of their intent. 
I propose that in light of the preceding thesis either of the 
following policy proposals could be endorsed. (1) The current definition 
of brain death as outlined in the UDDA is maintained but an exception is 
stipulated for anencephalic infants given their inability to achieve any 
state of consciousness or awareness. (2) The current restrictions to 
organ donation are maintained as outlined in the UAGA but an exception is 





a I am indebted to Richard Wolfe of the Frances Countway Library at 
Harvard University Medical School for assisting me in accessing Dr. 
Beecher's papers. 
13 The issue of "experiencing pain" is an important one in the care of 
anencephalic infants since the use of anesthetic agents may eliminate the 
subcortical responses to pain but are not necessary to minimize or prevent 
suffering and may delay or alter "brain death" determination. 
c There is some evidence, however, that suggests that the increases 
in prenatal detection of anencephaly will mean a sharp drop in the 
availability of these donors as more women will choose to terminate such 
pregnancies. For example, in California about 50% of all pregnancies are 
screened during the second trimester, and approximately 95% of the 
detected anencephalics have been electively aborted.(177,124) 
01 The Loma Linda Medical Center trial is significant because it was 
the first and only trial of using anencephalics as organ donors in the United 
States. On December 18,1987, Loma Linda released its protocol which set 
forth the guidelines under which such infants could be utilized as donors in 
a manner consistent with applicable brain death statutes. Under the 
protocol, babies born with anencephaly would be sustained with a 
respirator for a maximum of seven days. During that period, doctors would 
remove the respirator every twelve hours in order to determine whether 
brain death had occurred. To avoid any conflicts of interest, such a 
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determination would be made by two Loma Linda physicians unaffiliated 
with the transplantation team, and, if necessary, an outside consultant 
would confirm the findings. This artificial ventilation preserved the baby’s 
organs in a condition suitable for transplantation, so that if brain death did 
occur during the prescribed period the organs could be immediately used. 
Finally, in order to ensure proper respect for the newborn, the protocol 
specified that babies who were not yet brain dead at the end of seven days 
would have their life support discontinued and be allowed to die. 
e On February 19,1986, California State Senators Marks, Nielsen and 
Rosenthal introduced a bill to amend sections of the California Health and 
Safety Code, the sections representing California's adoption of the UDDA. 
The proposed amended sections read as follows: 
"(a) An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible 
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) 
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem is dead. Additionally, an 
individual born with the condition of anencephaly is dead. 
(emphasis added) A determination of death must be made 
in accordance with accepted medical standards. 
(b) "Anencephaly".... means markedly defective 
development of the brain, together with absence of the 
bones of the cranial vault and the cerebral and cerebellar 
hemispheres, and with only a rudimentary brain stem and 
some traces of basal ganglia present." 
(Cal. S. 2018(1986)) 
The introduction of the bill in the California State Legislature created 
a storm of controversy, questions and uncertainty. Due to the confusion and 
consternation surrounding the bill, Senator Milton Marks, its primary 
sponsor, eliminated the proposed substantive changes in the 

determination-of-death law. In its stead, the legislature passed an 
amended version of the bill that merely required a state panel to examine 
the legal, medical and ethical issues pertaining to the original proposal. 
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f A similar bill permitting organ retrieval from anencephalics was 
also introduced in the New Jersey State Assembly. In contrast to the 
California bill, which focuses on modifying the definition of death, the New 
Jersey version seeks to achieve the same result by amending that state's 
adoption of the UAGA. The bill provides: 
"A parent of an anencephalic infant, either prior to or upon 
the birth of that infant, may submit to the attending 
physician or surgeon a written request for the donation of 
the body of that infant, or a part thereof, to any of the 
donees for any of the purposes stated in section 3 of the 
[UAGA]... to which the attending physician or surgeon 
shall consent in writing if the requested donation is 
medically suitable of purpose and safety, and if one of the 
parents does not object to the donation, regardless of 
whether the infant has sustained an irreversible cessation 
of circulatory and respiratory functions or an irreversible 
cessation of all functions of the brainstem." (emphasis 
added) State of N.J. Assembly Bill No. 3367 (1986) 
9 From the standpoint of criminal law, the issue of when life 
commences is very important. The law of homicide requires that the victim 
be a living human being. In common law, the killing of a fetus was not 
homicide unless the fetus had been "born alive." Being born alive required 
that the fetus be totally expelled from the mother and demonstrate "a clear 
sign of independent vitality," such as respiration, although respiration was 
not strictly required. In the United States, the "born alive" requirement has 
come to mean that once the fetus is "fully brought forth" from the body of 
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its mother it is considered a human being. This conclusion is supported by 
Roe v. Wade, which implies that live birth is both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of human life to which homicide laws might 
attach. Since the portions of the anencephalic's brain that control 
breathing are intact, these infants are capable of spontaneous respiration. 
Thus, upon birth they qualify as "human beings" under the relevant homicide 
statutes.(72, at pp. 924-5) 
h Punishment for child murder in medieval Europe, when meted out at 
all, was usually directed at (often unwed) mothers on the lower end of the 
socioeconomic scale and took cruel forms. A notable example was the 
practice of "sacking," in which the infanticidal mother was put in a sack 
and submerged in water for six hours, while a choir stood by and sang Psalm 
130, "Out of the depths I cry to Thee."(202, at p. 11) 
1 Guidelines for the determination of brain death in newborns without 
anencephaly are still not well established. The major reasons for 
hesitation in making this determination have included "(1) experience that 
suggests that guidelines for brain death in adults are not applicable to 
newborns, (2) insufficient data in the literature to make the drafting of 
official guidelines for newborns appropriate, (3) fear of misinterpreting a 
reversible absence of function due to immaturity as brain death, and (4) the 
fact that most brain injuries occur unobserved either prenatally or during 
labor, with unknown severity, and may therefore lead to (5) an uncertain 
prognosis."(142, at p. 349) 
i Richard Zaner rejects the "slippery slope" as a legitimate argument. 
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His basis for this position is based on two premises - (1) that the logic of 
the "slippery slope" is fallacious and (2) that the foundation of the slippery 
slope is the "fear" about a "tendency" that researchers and physicians will 
abuse and misuse their powers. To explain the fallacy of "slippery slope" 
argumentation, Zaner points out, "If the first step is accepted, the evil at 
the slope's bottom is inevitable. This is a version of affirming the 
antecedent, and from this no conclusion whatever follows. In some 
versions.the logical fallacy of denying the consequent is also 
committed: the evils which will result must be rejected; therefore, not 
even the first step should be permitted. Again, no conclusion follows."(204, 
at p. 207) In regards to the second premise, Zaner elaborates, "At its root 
is a certain psychological observation, coupled with an appeal to fear: once 
people become accustomed to something they find it easier, perhaps even 
attractive, not only to do it again and again (developing a habit) but also [to] 
engage in a different but related activity which, however, is bad. Examples 
include welshing on a promise, not telling the truth, fudging on getting 
consent, etc."(204, at p. 208) The focus of the argument then, is on the 
people doing the action, not on the action itself (nor the technical means or 
definitions required by the action). B[T]he slippery slope has its force 
mainly in the distrust of persons - they are not able to resist the 
temptations to continue each step down the slippery slope all the way to 
the bottom. For each step down differs so little from the prior one that we 
are easily duped; the first was okay, so the second seems okay as well...." 
Zaner considers the argument an illicit appeal to distrust, suspicion and 
fear and rejects it because he believes that the psychological observation 
is at best dubious in most cases and that the tendencies or temptabilities 
of most people are at best presumptive and hardly the grounds upon which 
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to build an argument for "moral prohibition." 
k Among the 15 criteria Joseph Fletcher lists that form a composite 
picture of man are minimal intelligence ("any individual... who falls below 
the I.Q. 40-mark... is questionably a person; below the 20-mark, not a 
person") and neocortical function. ("In a way, this is the cardinal indicator, 
the one all others are hinged upon.").(66, at pp. 1,3) 
1 The Peel Commission Report, issued in 1972, defined a "previable" 
fetus as follows: "one which, although it may show some but not all signs of 
life, has not yet reached the stage at which it is able, and is incapable of 
being made able, to function as a self-sustaining whole independently of 
any connection with the mother." Presumably, heartbeat and respiration are 
prominent examples of "signs of life" that, although present, are not 
sufficient to confer viability on a fetus which cannot "function as a 
self-sustaining whole" independent of the mother. This definition clearly 
points to the case of a very immature fetus ex utero, which cannot be 
sustained under present technology. Such a fetus, although it may be able 
to breathe without assistance, is nonviable because it cannot become a 
stable organism and hence faces imminent death. Under this definition, 
anencephalics are also nonviable despite their ability to breathe on their 
own and to maintain a heartbeat. Since their respiratory function will soon 
begin to deteriorate due to the lack of a developed brain, they too face 
imminent death and are therefore nonviable.(143) 
m If neocortical functions - the capacity to think, feel, communicate, 
or experience our environment - are the key to human life, then the loss of 
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neocortical functions should be the key to human death. If the irreversible 
loss of an organism's essentially significant attributes are the capacity for 
consciousness and higher cortical functions rather than for autonomic 
bodily integration, then people who have lost these distinguishing features 
of human life should be treated as dead. 
n Anxiety over a possible irrational backlash generated by a "gut 
feeling" should not be dismissed lightly, since societal attitude is a crucial 
factor in the success of any effort to increase the supply of transplantable 
organs. A 1987 Gallup poll revealed that among people who were aware of 
organ transplants 82% were very or somewhat likely to donate the organs of 
their deceased loved ones, yet the number willing to donate their own 
organs was at 43%. These numbers are interesting when compared to a 
1985 poll which found that 53% of those surveyed would donate the organs 
of a relative who had just died but only 50% were willing to donate their 
own and only 47% felt that removal of organs on declaration of brain death 
is appropriate.(117, at p. 3111) The two reasons most frequently given as 
"very important" for the reluctance by most to sign donor cards were: 'They 
might do something to me before I am really dead" (23%) and "I'm afraid the 
doctors might hasten my death if they needed my organs" (21%). Clearly 
these results suggest that many individuals do not fully understand that a 
declaration of death (synonymous with brain death) is required before 
organs can be removed for transplantation. 
0 It is for this reason that many Catholic thinkers believe that an 
anencephalic does not have a human soul. 
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P It is interesting to note that as human societies have become more 
sophisticated, particularly in recent times, the traditionalistic 
eschatologies have begun to lose their import. Medieval concepts of death 
and judgment are not as meaningful, and beliefs that inspired some of these 
images and traditions have been forgotten or abandoned. The elaborate 
funeral processions are gone, except for a dignitary of state.The shrines are 
gone, funerals are streamlined, having only a simple procession sometimes 
limited to the family. Cemeteries are no longer elaborate nor art-filled. 
Instead they are landscaped lawns with simple flat markers, no monuments, 
no mausoleums, no obelisks. 
P It is interesting that in ancient times, and until the time of Bacon 
in the Seventeenth Century, medicine was conducted under three rules: to 
relieve suffering, to attenuate disease and to refrain from treating those 
who were hopelessly ill.(5) Dealing with hopeless illness, it was thought, 
would tend to disparage medicine and could lead to charlatanism. As 
society became more secular and more interested in this life than in 
eternity, the physician's obligation to sustain life evolved, and was well 
established by the end of the Seventeenth Century.(113, at p. 1466) In fact 
until the early Nineteenth century, the Church advised the dying to avoid 
doctors since they would provide such things as opium which would "impair" 
preparations for death and making peace with God. 
r The history of attempted transplantations can be traced back to the 
Third Century A.D. when two Roman brothers tried to replace the gangrenous 
leg of a church elder with a healthy leg from a dying Felician Moor. In the 
Sixteenth Century, the Italian physician Tagliacozzi was consulted by a 
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nobleman who wanted his nose, destroyed by syphilis, to be replaced with 
the nose of a slave. Tagliacozzi declined, however, because the "singular 
character" of the individual would be violated by such a procedure.(81, at p 
1012) 
s The Harvard criteria as outlined in the report require that 
neurologic examinations disclose: 
(11 Unreceptivity and unresponsitivitv to external stimuli. Stated 
simply, this means that the individual does not show any signs of 
awareness of external stimuli, e.g. sound, touch, pain, etc. 
(2) No movements or breathing. In other words, the only motion 
observed in the body is that which is produced by external manipulation; 
even breathing must be done by machine. 
(3) No reflexes. Even severely ill or injured persons will demonstrate 
reflexes in the concentration of the pupils, for example, if there is 
sufficient life in the brain. This may be true even when the patient is 
entirely unconscious. 
(4) Flat encephalogram. An encephalogram measures through sensors 
attached to the skull, the minute electrical activity associated with the 
living brain. A flat encephalogram refers to the straight line produced on 
the instruments recording paper when there is no wave activity at all. 
(5) No drug intoxication or hypothermia. These have been several 
reported "recoveries" from what was believed to be "irreversible" coma 
when either of the above was the cause of the patient's condition. 
(6) Persistence of these conditions for 24 hours.(541 
* These criteria differed from the Harvard criteria only in that spinal 
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reflexes were not included in the President's Commission's report and the 
list of contraindications to certification of brain death was broadened to 
include presence of neuromuscular blockers, CNS infections and metabolic 
encephalopathies.(149) 
u Following a British television program in 1980 that suggested that 
not all organ donors were in fact dead at the time of donation, thousands of 
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